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I. INTRODUCTION
During his 2005 nomination hearing before the United States Senate, Chief
Justice John Roberts declared, "Judges are like umpires . . . . The role of an
umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but
it is a limited role."' Not all Supreme Court Justices have agreed with Roberts. In
Johnson v. United States, Felix Frankfurter insisted, "Federal judges are not
referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice."'
Although the umpire analogy has broad appeal, the reality is that many
judges assume a role that goes far beyond that of a referee. "The great tides and
currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass
the judges by[,]" Benjamin Cardozo famously observed.' Judges, Cardozo
* Attorney, Godfrey & Kahn, S.C.; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2005; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2002.
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005), (statement of John G. Roberts,
Jr.).
2. 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
3. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
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stressed, "do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not
help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do."4
No event demonstrated that fact more dramatically than the most famous and
momentous political scandal in American history. The "Wars of Watergate," as
the historian Stanley Kutler has aptly described the epic 1970s political scandal,
posed the United States with its most severe constitutional crisis since the Civil
War.' Watergate involved fundamental issues of executive privilege, the
separation of powers, presidential impeachment, and the rights of criminal
defendants. It triggered sweeping political and legal reforms, from campaign
finance to the independent counsel law. The scandal's climactic outcome-the
resignation of a President-remains a singular event in the life of our nation.
A lone federal district court judge, John Sirica, stood at the center of the
Watergate storm. This Article examines the trial of the Watergate burglars, one
of the most important criminal proceedings in modern American history. Sirica
presided over the trial of five burglars arrested at the Democratic National
Committee headquarters in Washington's Watergate office complex on June 17,
1972. The break-in was part of a political espionage campaign conducted by
aides to President Nixon, a fact that the administration would attempt feverishly
to hide from the courts. Within days of the burglars' arrests, Nixon directed his
staff to obstruct the criminal investigation. By concealing the burglars' ties to the
White House, Nixon hoped to preserve his reelection chances in the 1972
presidential campaign. The cover-up initially worked. Nixon won reelection in a
landslide, and investigators failed to establish any direct connection between the
burglars and the administration.
However, in January 1973, the truth began to emerge in Judge Sirica's
courtroom. The burglars' trial-and, in particular, Sirica's highly unorthodox
approach to sentencing-shattered the administration's wall of silence. The
original scope of the prosecution's case focused solely on the break-in itself
rather than on the extent of the conspiracy behind it. But Sirica's aggressive
intervention forced the truth out. The judge's well-deserved reputation for harsh
sentences and his relentless questioning of the witnesses on the extent of the
Watergate cover-up spurred a race to the courthouse among key figures in the
Nixon Administration. Within weeks of the trial's conclusion, White House
Counsel John Dean, Watergate burglar James McCord, and presidential aide Jeb
Stuart Magruder decided to cooperate with prosecutors and testify against the
administration.' After the trial, the Senate established an investigative committee,
4. Id.
5. See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON
(1990) [hereinafter THE WARS OF WATERGATE].
6. See infra Part II.A (detailing the break-in and the initial cover-up); see also infra Part III (examining
the collapse of the cover-up).
7. See infra Part III.B (detailing the sentencing), see also Part III.A. (detailing the trial's role in breaking
down the wall of silence).
8. See FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF
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and the Justice Department appointed a special prosecutor. The administration
fought for a year to prevent further exposure of its misdeeds, but the evidence of
criminal activity became overwhelming. On August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned, the
only President ever forced from office.
As a matter of public memory, Watergate has been celebrated as an example
of how the "system worked."9 The battle over Watergate, historian Stanley Kutler
has observed, "offered eloquent testimony that the nation had a serious
commitment to the rule of law."' In his autobiography, Judge Sirica asserted that
the scandal vindicated the judiciary's role in exposing executive branch
wrongdoing. "Despite efforts in our executive branch to distort the truth, to
fabricate a set of facts that looked innocent," Sirica contended, "the court system
served to set the record straight.""
There is no question that Watergate's ultimate outcome was just. As the
break-in vividly demonstrated, a lawless streak ran deep in the Nixon
Administration, starting with the President himself. Nixon fully understood the
legal significance of his actions. He was an honors graduate of Duke University
Law School'2 and in private practice had even argued a case before the Supreme
Court.1 Although a highly intelligent attorney, Nixon neither respected nor
obeyed the law. The President deserved his fate.
But the rule of law in America is not based on outcomes. The rule of law
rests on the means used to achieve justice. A fair trial requires strict adherence to
the procedural and constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. To
a remarkable degree, the Watergate trial failed to meet those basic requirements,
particularly with respect to the right of criminal defendants to remain silent. Just
as the Watergate scandal challenged the resilience of the American political
system, the burglars' trial tested the limits of the American criminal justice
system.
Judge Sirica played a crucial role in the outcome of both the burglars' trial
and the larger Watergate scandal. Had Sirica confined matters to the narrow case
brought against the burglars by the prosecution, the defendants may not have
talked, and Nixon might well have survived to serve out his second term. Sirica's
pursuit of the truth in his courtroom riveted the nation. By openly challenging the
White House's version of events, he galvanized public opinion against the
administration's efforts to conceal its involvement in Watergate. But the
Watergate trial also raised profound questions about the proper role of a trial
RICHARD NIXON 298-300, 318-33, 364 (explaining the courtroom proceedings); see also KUTLER, THE WARS
OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 260-64.
9. THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 222 (1975).
10. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 618.
11. JOHN J. SIRICA, TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS,
THE PARDON 301 (1979).
12. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN, 1913-1962, at 83 (1987).
13. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, 1962-1972, at 82 (1989) [hereinafter
THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN].
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court judge. Sirica's controversial tactics confronted the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals with a fundamental question: Is a judge always limited to the role of an
umpire, or, under certain circumstances of national importance, may a judge take
an active, investigatory role in the proceedings before the court? For his part,
Judge Sirica had no doubt what the answer to that question was. Indeed,
Watergate demonstrated that, within the confines of the courtroom, the authority
of a trial court judge far exceeds that of the President of the United States. 14
Consequently, the trial's historical legacy remains profoundly ambiguous. By
forcing the burglars to cooperate with investigators, Sirica helped drive a
criminal administration from office. But in the process, Sirica's intimidation of
the defendants violated basic principles of judicial fairness and impartiality.
Indeed, from the outset Sirica abandoned any pretense of impartiality. He worked
with investigators to find ways to force the defendants to talk, and even
counseled the prosecutors regarding trial strategy. Most troubling of all, at
sentencing, Sirica imposed thirty-to-forty-year prison terms-far out of line with
what the severity of the crime merited-to coerce the defendants into cooperating
with prosecutors and Senate investigators. Sirica's abusive use of his sentencing
powers flagrantly disregarded the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury."
In the end, Judge Sirica approached the case with an agenda of his own, one
that was more aggressive than even that of the prosecution. The judge was far
from a mere "umpire" in the proceedings. Justice Frankfurter's description of
judges as "functionaries of justice" perfectly captured Sirica's conception of his
own role during the Watergate trial. Yet, as Judge Learned Hand once observed,
"Prosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions in the administration
of justice; they must not merge."" Although Sirica's ends were laudable-
exposing a criminal conspiracy that reached to the highest levels of the White
House-the means by which the court achieved its goals were deeply
problematic. The "system" may have worked in Watergate, but only in the final
result.
II. THE CRIME
A. The Watergate Break-In
In 1968, the Republican nominee Richard Nixon won the presidency by a
razor-thin margin over his Democratic opponent, Vice President Hubert
Humphrey. 7 The close outcome made a deep impression on Nixon, which lasted
14. See infra Part II (examining Sirica's intervention in the trial).
15. See id. (examining the trial and sentencing).
16. United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2nd Cir. 1945).
17. AMBROSE, THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 220 (Nixon won by less than one
percentage point).
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throughout his first term in office. He and his top aides feared the 1972 campaign
would be equally tight.' Therefore, in 1971, the administration secretly took
steps to enhance President Nixon's reelection prospects.'9 Those steps led directly
to Watergate.
The Watergate burglary was the brainchild of former FBI agent G. Gordon
Liddy and retired CIA operative E. Howard Hunt." A graduate of Fordham Law
School, Liddy had served as Bureau Supervisor for the FBI headquarters in
Washington.21 During his CIA career, Hunt participated in the 1954 overthrow of
the left-wing government in Guatemala and the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion
of Cuba.22 Liddy and Hunt met when they both went to work for the White House
during President Nixon's first term in office.
As their first assignment on the administration's behalf, Liddy and Hunt led a
"White House Special Investigation Unit," known informally as the White House
"Plumbers."24 Leaks to the press obsessed the President and his senior aides.
White House paranoia over internal leaks reached a peak in 1971, when a
Defense Department consultant, Daniel Ellsberg, leaked a classified Pentagon
report on the Vietnam War to the New York Times.2' On the orders of senior
Nixon aides, Liddy and Hunt organized a burglary of the offices of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, in an effort to steal Ellsberg's medical records.
The Plumbers hoped the records would discredit Ellsberg.
Although the Fielding break-in failed to produce useful information on
Ellsberg, the Plumbers' efforts caught the attention of the Committee for the
Reelection of the President (CRP), a fundraising organization supporting the
President's 1972 reelection campaign.2 The CRP enlisted Liddy and Hunt to
conduct political intelligence operations against the Democratic Party and its
presidential nominee, George McGovern.29 Knowledge of Liddy and Hunt's
18. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 3 (1980).
19. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
20. Id.; see also H.R. REP., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 55-56 (1975) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
21. G. GORDON LIDDY, WILL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF G. GORDON LIDDY 53, 58, 93 (1980).
22. JIM HOUGAN, SECRET AGENDA: WATERGATE, DEEP THROAT AND THE CIA 4-5 (1984).
23. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that Hunt was Liddy's chief assistant); see also
LIDDY, supra note 21, at 148.
24. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 54-55 n.16 ("The Unit was named the 'Plumbers' since its mission was to
stop leaks of classified information.").
25. ROBERT DALLEK, NIXON AND KISSINGER: PARTNERS IN POWER 315-16 (2007).
26. Id. at 310-12.
27. U.S. v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 944; JEB STUART MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN LIFE: ONE MAN'S ROAD TO WATERGATE 170-
173 (1974).
29. See Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 52 ("Gemstone was the brainchild of G. Gordon Liddy, CRP's general
counsel, who had been hired in late 1971 to develop plans for gathering political intelligence and for countering
demonstrations.").
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activities reached as high as Attorney General John Mitchell.3" Although Mitchell
rejected Liddy and Hunt's more ambitious plans-which included kidnapping
anti-war protesters, using prostitutes to blackmail Democratic officials, and
firebombing the Brookings Institution, a liberal think tank in Washington-the
Attorney General approved a scaled-down political espionage campaign, code-
named GEMSTONE. One of the first missions of the GEMSTONE conspirators
was to wiretap the phones at the Democratic National Committee (DNC)
headquarters at the Watergate.
Liddy and Hunt assembled a team of covert operatives headed by former
CIA agent James McCord." A lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force
Reserve, McCord was the security coordinator for the CRP. 4 Besides McCord,
the burglary team consisted of four individuals with ties to both the anti-Castro
Cuban community and the CIA: Bernard Barker, Frank Sturgis, Eugenio
Martinez, and Virgilio Gonzalez." Martinez and Barker had also participated in
the break-in at Dr. Fielding's office." Hunt told the burglars that they were part
of a classified national intelligence program, and that the Watergate break-in was
necessary to protect America from a "Communist conspiracy."
The first Watergate break-in occurred on May 28, 1972. McCord and his
team entered the offices in the middle of the night and bugged selected DNC
phones.39 However, the eavesdropping devices did not work as planned,
necessitating a second break-in.4 In addition, Jeb Stuart Magruder, the Deputy
Director of the CRP, instructed Liddy that the burglars needed to photograph
files in DNC Chairman Lawrence O'Brien's office. 4 1 To improve their electronic
30. FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 56, 58.
31. Id. at 56-58; LIDDY, supra note 21, at 171-72, 196-98.
32. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 181-86, 219.
33. Id. at 191; see also JAMES W. MCCORD, JR., A PIECE OF TAPE: THE WATERGATE STORY 16-19
(1974) (examining the meetings between Liddy and McCord).
34. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 20-21 (1974).
35. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 52 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also MCCORD, supra note 33,
at 23 (noting that throughout Watergate, the national press and Senate investigators referred to them as the
"Cubans.").
36. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
37. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1975); BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note
34, at 234.
38. MCCORD, supra note 33, at 25.
39. Id.; see also LIDDY, supra note 21, at 233.
40. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 234-35. The lack of a clear explanation of the second bugging's purpose
has given rise to a wide range of theories about the break-in, none of which have produced anything more than
circumstantial and speculative evidence. See, e.g., HOUGAN, supra note 22, at 161-75 (detailing the problems
with the initial bugging and the decision to make another break-in); Phil Stanford, Watergate Revisited: Did the
Press-and the Courts-Really Get to the Bottom of History's Most Famous Burglary?, 24 COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. 46, 46-49 (1986) (noting that a sex scandal might have prompted the break-in); LEN
COLODNY & ROBERT GETTLIN, SLENT Coup: THE REMOVAL OF A PRESIDENT (1992) (putting forth alternate
explanations about the break-in).
41. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 237.
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collection efforts and to satisfy Magruder's request, McCord's team broke into
the Watergate for a second time on June 17.4
The second Watergate break-in resulted in disaster for the burglars and the
Nixon Administration. After twice finding tape on the lock of an interior door, a
night watchman notified police of a possible burglary in progress.43 At 2 a.m. on
June 17, D.C. police caught the burglars while they were still inside the DNC
offices.' None of them resisted arrest.45 Monitoring the break-in from two
neighboring hotels, Liddy, Hunt, and McCord's associate, Alfred Baldwin, a
41former FBI agent, escaped the scene.
They would not remain free for long. As Jeb Stuart Magruder later observed,
"McCord's arrest was a disaster, because he was CRP's security chief; the
Cubans might not even know whom they had been working for, but McCord
would be very hard to explain away." 47 Compounding the White House's
problems, the burglars left a long trail of evidence behind them. Police
confiscated an address book from one of the burglars that included Hunt's name
and his White House phone number.48 Investigators also turned up a key to the
hotel room where Liddy and Hunt had observed the break-in.49 Most critical of
all, the police found thousands of dollars in cash on the burglars, and in Hunt's
hotel room."o The FBI traced the money to the Miami bank account of the CRP,
an account controlled by Bernard Barker, one of the burglars." The ringleaders'
predicament turned from bad to worse when, in exchange for immunity from
prosecution, Baldwin agreed to testify against Liddy and Hunt.52 On September
15, 1972, a grand jury indicted Hunt, Liddy, McCord, and the Cubans on charges
of conspiracy, burglary, and illegal interception of electronic communications.
In response, the White House mounted an epic stonewalling campaign.54 As
Jeb Stuart Magruder later acknowledged, the cover-up "was immediate and
42. Id.
43. EMERY, supra note 8, at 132-33.
44. MCCORD, supra note 33, at 29-31.
45. Id. at 31; see also Lawrence Meyer, Watergate Defendant Claims 'Bugs' Legal, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 1973, at Al (discussing the arrest of the Watergate burglars).
46. See E. HOWARD HUNT WITH GREG AUNAPU, AMERICAN SPY: MY SECRET HISTORY IN THE CIA,
WATERGATE, AND BEYOND 212 (2007); see also LIDDY, supra note 21, at 246; MCCORD, supra note 33, at 32.
47. MAGRUDER, supra note 28.
48. EMERY, supra note 8, at 148.
49. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 245.
50. Id. at 262; see also EMERY, supra note 8, at 148; Meyer, supra note 45.
51. See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining Liddy's role in
converting Mexican checks into cash); FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 70-71; KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE:
THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK AMERICA 47-48 (2003).
52. EMERY, supra note 8, at 212.
53. Liddy, 509 F.2d at 431; United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 53-55 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (detailing the early steps taken in
the cover-up).
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automatic; no one ever considered that there would not be a cover-up."" An
arrogant sense of self-confidence informed the administration's decision. "It
seemed inconceivable," Magruder later wrote, "that with our political power we
could not erase this mistake we had made."" Although Hunt had an office at the
White House and Liddy served as the CRP's general counsel, Nixon's Press
Secretary Ron Ziegler publicly declared that no one in the administration had any
role in Watergate.1 Ziegler characterized the break-in as a "'third-rate burglary"'
unworthy of serious press attention.
The denials worked. By the fall of 1972, the Watergate scandal faded from
public attention. At the cover-up's outset, Nixon himself did not see the burglars'
arrests as a threat to his presidency. As a June 1972 recording from the Oval
Office's audio-taping system later revealed, Nixon spent only six minutes
discussing the cover-up during one of his earliest post-burglary strategy
sessions.9 In casual fashion, he ordered his aides to cover up White House
involvement and obstruct the investigation."' He then spent an hour discussing
unrelated topics."' Nixon was confident that investigators would never unearth
the full scope of his administration's role in the scandal.
For months, Nixon's confidence seemed well-founded. After announcing the
indictments in September 1972, the Justice Department declared, "We have
absolutely no evidence to indicate that any others should be charged."6 2 That
evening, White House Counsel John Dean assured the President that the "two
former White House people" who were indicted-Hunt and Liddy-were "low
level."" Dean concluded that prosecutors did not have "very much of a tie" to the
White House. 64 "Phase one of the cover-up was a success," Dean later recalled.
"The doors that led to Magruder, Mitchell and many others were closed, at least
for the present.",6 Nixon, however, left nothing to chance. To ensure the burglars'
silence, the administration secretly funneled $187,000 in cash to them as they
awaited trial.6
55. MAGRUDER, supra note 28, at 220.
56. Id.
57. AMBROSE, THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 567.
58. EMERY, supra note 8, at 161.
59. RAYMOND PRICE, WITH NIXON 360 (1977).
60. STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES 67-70 (1998) [hereinafter ABUSE
OF POWER] (detailing a recorded conversation between Nixon and Haldeman on June 23, 1972); see also
WHITE, supra note 9, at 164.
61. PRICE, supra note 59, at 359-60.
62. AMBROSE, THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 608.
63. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 60, at 151.
64. Id.
65. JOHN DEAN III, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 133 (1976).
66. Id.
67. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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On October 3, 1972, the House Banking Committee rejected the request of
Rep. Wright Patman of Texas for subpoena power to investigate Watergate.
One month later, Nixon won reelection with sixty percent of the popular vote.
He also carried forty-nine of fifty states, one of the biggest landslides in history.
As 1972 drew to a close, Watergate seemed destined to be a footnote in the
history of Richard Nixon's presidency.
B. The Judge
In January 1973, seven defendants went on trial for the Watergate break-in:
the two ringleaders, Hunt and Liddy, and the five burglars, McCord, Sturgis,
Gonzalez, Martinez, and Barker." Watergate prosecutors Earl Silbert, Seymour
Glanzer, and Donald Campbell, served in the United States Attorney's Office,
which reported to the Nixon Justice Department.72 Although Mitchell had
resigned as Attorney General, his replacement, Richard Kleindienst, was a Nixon
ally." The day after the burglars' arrests, Liddy informed Kleindienst of the
CRP's role in the Watergate break-in. According to Liddy, Kleindienst
responded by stressing that protecting the President was his top priority.
Through its control of the Justice Department, the Nixon Administration seemed
well-positioned to limit the scope of the investigation.
No one appreciated the risk of White House interference more than Judge
Sirica. Although a Republican himself, Sirica suspected a wide-ranging
conspiracy reaching deep into the Nixon Administration. Consequently, he saw
exposure of the cover-up as a principal goal of the criminal trial. "From the
beginning," Sirica later wrote, "it was my hope that the trial would bring out the
truth, that, within the framework of the law, the trial would be the forum in which
the unanswered questions of Watergate would be answered."7 Sirica reasoned
that with no congressional investigation underway, "[t]he United States District
Court was left as the only branch of government trying to get to the bottom of
Watergate." 8 The judge had no doubt who the principal antagonist was in his
pursuit of the truth. Writing about the burglars' trial years later, Sirica revealed,
68. EMERY, supra note 8, at 219-20.
69. AMBROSE, THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 651.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
72. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 209; see also BERNSTILEN & WOODWARD,
supra note 34, at 230.
73. See EMERY, supra note 8, at 171-72 (noting that Kleindienst would have rather resigned than
prosecuted his predecessor Mitchell).
74. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 252.
75. Id. at 252-253.
76. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 44, 62.
77. Id. at 61-62.
78. Id. at 52.
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"On more nights than I now care to remember, I would wake up after only a few
hours of sleep, my heart racing, wondering what new stumbling block President
Nixon and his associates would throw in front of me the next day."79
Sirica was an unlikely hero. He had an undistinguished record on the bench."'
A graduate of Georgetown, Sirica spent 30 years in private practice before
President Eisenhower appointed him to the federal bench in 1957."' During his
years as a federal district court judge, Sirica had a remarkably high rate of
reversal by appellate courts.) His errors often involved basic procedural
mistakes. In one case, Sirica denied a foreign corporation's motion to quash
service of process even though none of its officers, agents, or employees had
been served with the plaintiff's complaint. In another, Sirica dismissed a
Maryland plaintiff's case on grounds of forum non conveniens, despite the fact
that the plaintiff's car accident occurred in the District of Columbia, D.C.
residents witnessed the accident, D.C. police investigated the accident, and D.C.
doctors treated the plaintiff's injuries.84
Sirica believed that as a trial court judge, he had "to more or less shoot from
the hip."" His principal notoriety stemmed from his nickname "Maximum John,"
a product of his penchant for imposing long prison sentences.' His strong
inclination in favor of stiff sentences would prove crucial during the trial's
aftermath.
In the trial of the Watergate burglars, Sirica faced the greatest challenge of
his career. Intense public interest in the case meant that Sirica's actions would be
more closely scrutinized than ever before. The magnitude of the challenge
became clear even before the trial began. In December 1972, Washington Post
reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein contacted members of the grand
jury in an effort to discover the nature and content of the evidence the
prosecutors had presented." When Sirica learned of the reporters' efforts to
interview the jurors, he threatened to send Woodward and Bernstein to jail."
Only the intervention of the Post's attorney Edward Bennett Williams-a close
friend of Sirica's-and the prosecution's recommendation of leniency kept the
79. Id. at 297.
80. See Harvey Katz, Some Call It Justice: A Special Report on Washington Area Judges, 5
WASHINGTONIAN 46, 52 (Sept. 1970) (noting that Sirica had a high reversal rate, and was known for making
careless mistakes).
81. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 26, 39.
82. EMERY, supra note 8, at 237; see also KuTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 260.
83. See generally DeSanno & Son, Inc. v. Brown, 313 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (reversing Sirica's
decision).
84. Caspar v. Devine, 257 F.2d 197, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
85. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 72.
86. Peter Osnos, Unanswered Questions Plague a Tough Judge, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1973, at A10;
see also EMERY, supra note 8, at 238.
87. BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 207-11.
88. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 54-55.
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journalists out of jail.' Nevertheless, despite the judge's admonition, Washington
Post editor Ben Bradlee directed his reporters to leave no stone uncovered in
their pursuit of the story. 9() Indeed, the media's scrutiny of the case would only
intensify in the weeks ahead.
The White House posed the most daunting obstacle to Sirica's pursuit of the
truth. Nixon's aides worked behind the scenes to maintain the burglars' silence
and to cover up all traces of the administration's involvement. Shortly after the
burglars' arrests, Henry Petersen, head of the Justice Department's Criminal
Division, promised White House Counsel John Dean that the prosecutors would
not mount a "'fishing expedition.'" 9 According to Dean, Petersen assured him
that Earl Silbert, the chief Watergate prosecutor, was only "investigating a break-
in . . . he knows better than to wander off beyond his authority . . . ."9 One month
after the Watergate break-in, Chief of Staff Robert Haldeman assured the
President that the Justice Department would not pursue investigative leads to the
White House. Haldeman informed Nixon that Petersen was "directing the
investigation along the channels that will not produce the kind of answers we
don't want produced."' Haldeman also reported that Petersen believed the
prosecutors "all are of the view that they don't want to indict the White House,
they only want to indict the-they want to tighten up that case on that criminal
act and limit it to that to the degree that they can . ...
Although he knew the reverse to be true, Attorney General Kleindienst
publicly declared "the [Watergate] investigation was 'one of the most intensive,
objective, and thorough investigations in many years."" Meanwhile, in the D.C.
Jail, G. Gordon Liddy made plans to kill his fellow inmate and Watergate co-
conspirator Howard Hunt, if necessary, to prevent Hunt from exposing the
96President's involvement in the cover-up.
With its attention focused on the prosecutors, the administration never
considered the possibility of an investigation mounted by the judicial branch. As
Sirica later explained:
The whole case looked more and more like a big cover-up .... Perhaps
some other federal judges would have limited themselves to ruling on
objections. But one of the reasons I had always wanted to be a federal
89. Id.; see also EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS ULTIMATE INSIDER;
LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 276-77 (1991).
90. BEN BRADLEE, A GOOD LIFE: NEWSPAPERING AND OTHER ADVENTURES 346 (1995).
91. EMERY, supra note 8, at 172.
92. Id.
93. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 60, at 102.
94. Id.
95. AMBROSE, TIF TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 607-08.
96. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 309.
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judge was that, damn it, nobody could stop me from asking the right
questions.9
His efforts to do so would transform the Watergate case from a "third-
rate burglary" into the political scandal of the century.
III. THE JUDGE AS INVESTIGATOR
A. The Scope of the Prosecution's Case
As the White House had hoped, prosecutors initially took a narrow view of
the case. Unable to produce evidence of a broader cover-up, the U.S. Attorney's
Office focused on the immediate facts at hand: the incontrovertible evidence that
five burglars had broken into the DNC offices; the circumstantial evidence that
they had broken in for the purposes of electronic eavesdropping; and the
mounting evidence that Liddy and Hunt had directed the burglary.9'
The judge was not pleased. Before empanelling the jury, Sirica made clear
his unhappiness with the prosecution's approach. On December 4, 1972, he
convened a pre-trial hearing on the planned exhibits. At the judge's insistence,
the conversation moved to substantive matters. Sirica pressed Silbert "to trace the
money found on the defendants."9' In response, Silbert noted that he lacked
evidence identifying the ultimate source of the burglars' funds as well as their
motive for bugging the DNC headquarters.""' Although the judge conceded that
"technically, they didn't have to prove a motive, only that seven men were guilty
of the charges against themr[,]" he urged the prosecutors to drill deeper."" In open
court, Sirica declared, "This jury is going to want to know[:] what did these men
go into that headquarters for? . . . Was their sole purpose political espionage?
Were they paid? Was there financial gain? Who hired them? Who started this?"12
Although the prosecution declined to follow his advice, the judge refused to
take no for an answer. He again met in chambers with Silbert a few days before
the trial began.""o According to Sirica's memoirs, he told Silbert, "Earl, look,
you've got a great opportunity in this case if you go right down the middle, let
the chips fall where they may. Don't let anybody put any pressure on you.""M The
97. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 74-75.
98. See generally United States. v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 212 n.5 (D.C.Cir. 1975); United States v.
McCord, 509 F.2d 334 (D.C.Cir. 1974); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C.Cir. 1974); United States v.
Hunt, 514 F.2d 270 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
99. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 56.
100. Id. at 57.
101. Id.
102. Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Watergate Trial Judge Wants 'Exploration', WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 1973, at A15.
103. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 58.
104. Id.
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judge told Silbert about his own days as a prosecutor investigating corruption at
the Federal Communications Commission. Sirica wanted Silbert to know of his
own "direct experience" with exposing "cover-ups.""o" In his autobiography, the
judge explained, "I wanted the young prosecutor to know just how white-washers
[sic] were engineered."6
Sirica's account suggests that he and Silbert met alone. If that was in fact the
case, it constituted an ex parte communication in clear breach of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Although the Watergate trial long predated the District of
Columbia's adoption of the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1990 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, basic judicial protocols applied to Sirica nevertheless.
In 1924, the ABA adopted a predecessor to the Model Code, known as the
"Canons of Judicial Ethics." Section 17, which covered ex parte
communications, directed that a judge "should not permit private interviews,
arguments or communications designed to influence his judicial action . . . ."1
Moreover, the Canons advised, "Ordinarily all communications of counsel to the
judge, intended or calculated to influence action should be made known to
opposing counsel."'()"
As Sirica's account demonstrated, his communications to Silbert clearly
showed judicial partiality to the prosecution. Although the 1924 Canons did not
expressly ban ex parte judicial advice to counsel, Section 34 emphasized the
obvious fact that judges must be "impartial."109 To that end, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals required presiding judges to offer their trial recommendations
while in the presence of counsel for all parties. For example, in Jackson v. United
States, the D.C. Circuit directed, "[if a trial judge has definite ideas as to what
lines of inquiry ought to be pursued, he is free to call both counsel to the bench,
or in chambers and suggest what he wants done.""no The key point being, of
course, that counsel from both sides must be included. By excluding defense
counsel from his meeting with Silbert, and discussing with the prosecutor the line
of inquiry he wanted pursued, Sirica's pre-trial communication flew in the face
of the judicial standard established by the D.C. Circuit in Jackson.
But Sirica had no interest in aiding the defense's case. He wanted convictions
and, more importantly, full confessions. In his autobiography, the judge revealed
that on the eve of trial he privately hoped that his guidance to Silbert would
prompt the prosecutor to cast a wider net. "Although I had no feeling that the
break-in case could involve the president himself," Sirica wrote in his memoirs,
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS § 17 (1924).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 34.
110. 329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
355
2011 / Watergate, Judge Sirica, and the Rule of Law
"my instincts told me that if the truth came out, things could be difficult for some
of the president's friends and assistants.""'
To the judge's consternation, the prosecution's opening statement focused on
the crime it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt-the Watergate burglary-
and did not explore the possibility of a broader conspiracy. Although Silbert
promised the jury that the evidence would show that the CRP had paid the
burglars, he did not pursue the question of how high up the White House chain
the conspiracy went.12 "[F]rankly, I was disappointed[,]" the judge later
recalled."' "When Silbert got around to discussing the money found on the
defendants and the source of that money, I hoped he would unravel some of the
mystery of this case[,]" Sirica wrote.'14 Although the prosecutor "made it
clear ... that the defendants had been paid by the president's campaign
committee[,]" the judge expressed dismay that "Silbert said not a word about
whether or not they had known in advance about the break-in and bugging.""
Sirica also objected to the prosecution's focus on Liddy as the ringleader of
the burglary. Silbert, Sirica complained, left "the impression with the jury that
Liddy had somehow gone off on his own, had in effect misused the money and
the authority that the president's campaign aides had given him.""' The
prosecution maintained that financial trouble motivated the burglars.' 17 "The idea
was apparently that these men had gone into the Democratic headquarters for the
same reason a robber goes into a bank-they needed the money. This was the
most limited view of the case it was possible to take, and it frustrated me[,]"
Sirica explained."'
Indeed, the prosecution's theory of the case played directly into the
administration's hands. As Jeb Stuart Magruder later admitted, "Once we at CRP
denied any involvement in the Watergate break-in, it became necessary for us to
develop a complicated cover story that would place the full blame on Gordon
Liddy ... 1."119
The prosecutors' narrow focus on the burglary attracted criticism far beyond
Judge Sirica's courtroom. Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina accused the
prosecutors of having "muffed" opportunities to tie the break-in to the White
111. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 62.
112. Lawrence Meyer, E. Howard Hunt Pleads Guilty in Watergate Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1973,
at Al.
113. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 62.
114. Id. at 63.
115. Id. at 63-64.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Meyer, E. Howard Hunt Pleads Guilty in Watergate Case, supra note 112.
118. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 64. The prosecutors' narrow view of the case eventually led to an
investigation by Archibald Cox, the Watergate special prosecutor. Cox's review found no evidence that Silbert
participated in the cover-up. RICHARD BEN-VENISTE & GEORGE FRAMPTON, JR., STONEWALL: THE REAL
STORY OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION 24, 31 (1977).
119. MAGRUDER, supra note 28, at 228.
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House.12' Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox charged that during the
prosecution of the burglars "'it became apparent that the Department of Justice
was not investigating the charges as vigorously as the evidence then
warranted.""121 Time Magazine's editors complained that the prosecutors "showed
little zeal for tracing the source of the funds used by the men arrested at the
Watergate or determining who had authorized the politically motivated crime."'22
Senator Ervin concluded that "the prosecutors fell substantially short of prying
open and presenting to the grand jury the truth respecting the Watergate affair."12
The prosecution, however, had a plausible justification for taking a more
limited view of the case-they had no concrete evidence of a broader
conspiracy.124 Nixon's stonewalling campaign had worked, denying prosecutors
evidence that would have implicated White House officials. From his perch in
the White House, John Dean, the President's counsel, directed a massive
campaign of obstruction of justice. 12 Chief of Staff Robert Haldeman instructed
White House aide Chuck Colson that "'John Dean is handling the entire
Watergate matter now' . . . 'and any questions or input you have should be
directed to him and to no one else."" 26 At Dean's request, acting FBI Director L.
Patrick Gray secretly destroyed evidence seized from Howard Hunt's safe.127
Dean and Haldeman also continued to funnel tens of thousands of dollars to the
burglars for their silence. 12 Meanwhile, Assistant Attorney General Henry
Peterson provided a steady stream of confidential information to the President
and Dean, who in turn used that knowledge to further block the investigation.129
In short, the full weight of the executive branch stood between the prosecutors
and the truth.
The prosecutors also made a critical strategic error. In exchange for his
testimony, they offered immunity to Baldwin, but not to any of the other
defendants.""o Baldwin had no knowledge of the conspiracy beyond the break-in
120. ERVIN, supra note 18, at 12.
121. KuITLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 334.
122. Man of the Year, Judge John J. Sirica: Standing Firm for the Primacy of Law, TIME, Jan. 7, 1974,
at 10-11.
123. ERVIN, supra note 18, at 94.
124. Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Earl J. Silbert to be United States Attorney: Hearing
Before the S. Conn. on the Judiciary, 93 Cong. 181 (1974) [hereinafter Silbert Hearings].; Interview with Earl
Silbert, Oral History Project, D.C. Circuit Historical Society (Feb. 29, 1992), at 75, available at
http://www.dcchs.org/EarlJSilbert/silbert-transcript.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
125. See DEAN, supra note 65, at 131 ("The cover-up blistered on, with me throwing water on it.").
126. KuITLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 239.
127. EMERY, supra note 8, at 197.
128. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 56-58 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also STEPHEN AMBROSE,
NIXON: RUIN AND RECOVERY, 1973-1990, at 83-86 [hereinafter RuIN & RECOVERY] (detailing the continued
demands for money).
129. DEAN, supra note 65 at 110-11, 131, 202-03; see also KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra
note 5, at 302-03, 307-10, 315-16.
130. EMERY, supra note 8, at 212.
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itself, and thus his testimony only implicated the seven named defendants."' In
contrast, Liddy, Hunt, and McCord all possessed highly incriminating
information tying the break-in to senior figures at both the CRP and the White
House. The prosecutors had no hope of turning Liddy, who was fiercely loyal to
the administration, but the same was not true of Hunt and McCord.132 Both feared
long prison sentences and hoped the administration would pardon them.' Hunt
and McCord's fear of prison created opportunities for the prosecution. Indeed,
while the prosecution secured Baldwin's full cooperation in the investigation by
offering him immunity,134 they decided to pursue convictions of McCord and
Hunt rather than offer full immunity.1' This strategic decision nearly let the
White House off the hook. Indeed, if Sirica had not intervened in the case when
he did, the Nixon Administration would likely have succeeded in containing the
scandal to the named defendants.
The judge faced problems of his own. His efforts to get to the bottom of the
Watergate affair got off to a rocky start. Shortly after the trial began, Hunt
withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty on charges of
burglary, wiretapping, and conspiracy. In return for his guilty plea, the
prosecutors agreed to drop the other three charges pending against him.1 Sirica,
however, was not satisfied. As he later related, "My unstated feeling was that the
government had a good case against Hunt on all the counts in which he was
named.""" The judge also feared "the way the partial plea would look to the
public."' On January 11, Sirica informed Hunt that he would not accept the plea
to only three counts of indictment. 14( In an effort to pressure Hunt into talking,
Sirica demanded that Hunt plead guilty to all six counts against him.141 As the
judge saw it, "[t]he trial was the only place, at that time, where we could learn
the truth of the Watergate case. If Hunt simply pleaded guilty, took his medicine,
and went to jail, the chance that we would ever find out what was going on in the
case would be reduced."42 Sirica's effort to force the former CIA operative to
talk failed. Hunt not only maintained his silence on the scope of the Watergate
131. See Lawrence Meyer, Key U.S. Witness Tells of Bugging Democrats, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1973, at
A8 (detailing Baldwin's testimony against the other Watergate defendants).
132. See, e.g., LIDDY, supra note 21, at 306, 309 (detailing Liddy's preliminary plans to kill Hunt in
order to protect the administration).
133. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also FINAL REPORT, supra
note 20, at 108-09.
134. BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 65.
135. Silbert Hearings, supra note 124, at 181.
136. See United States v. Hunt, 514 F.2d 270, 271 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that there was a
conditional plea offer from the prosecution).
137. Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (D.D.C. 1980); see also SIRICA, supra note 11, at 67.
138. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 67.
139. Id. at 67-68.
140. Id. at 67; see also Bittman, 482 F. Supp. at 1019.
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142. Id. at 68.
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conspiracy, but also agreed to plead guilty to all charges.143 To reporters waiting
outside the courtroom, Hunt declared that no "higher-ups" were involved in the
conspiracy. 4'
Sirica's intervention was extraordinarily improper. Although the plea
agreement with Hunt held despite the judge's reinstatement of the three
additional counts, the episode displayed Sirica's willingness to merge judicial
functions with those of the prosecution. He had no grounds for doing so. The
decision regarding what crimes to charge a defendant with resides solely with the
executive branch, not the judicial branch. The Supreme Court underscored the
point in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, declaring, "In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.",14 This
would not be the last time that Sirica intruded upon executive branch functions
during the Watergate trial.
On January 15, following Hunt's lead, the four Cubans-Barker, Gonzalez,
Martinez, and Sturgis-pleaded guilty to seven counts of conspiracy, burglary,
and illegal interception of oral and wire communications.146 Before accepting
their guilty pleas, Sirica questioned each of them individually regarding the
voluntariness of their guilty pleas and the scope of the Watergate conspiracy.14 7
As Judge Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals later observed,
Sirica "went to great lengths in seeking to uncover [the burglars'] reasons for
participating in the break-in and for deciding to plead guilty."148 Nevertheless, the
burglars denied knowledge of a wider conspiracy and insisted that they were
under no pressure to plead guilty.149 Judge Sirica recognized the cover-up
unfolding before his eyes. When Barker insisted that he did not know who
funded the break-in, Sirica replied, "I am sorry, I don't believe you.""
Although procedurally proper, the thoroughness of Sirica's plea colloquy
posed a problem for the prosecution. By getting the burglars on record testifying
under oath that there was no broader conspiracy beyond the seven charged
defendants, the judge all but closed the door on using their testimony in the
future. If, at a later date, the defendants cracked and decided to tell all they knew,
their prior inconsistent statements would severely undermine their credibility as
witnesses. The prosecutors undoubtedly recognized this fact. The Washington
Post reported that during Sirica's plea colloquy Silbert sat at the prosecution
143. Id. at 68-69.
144. Id. at 69; see also KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 254; Trials: Starting on
Watergqate, TIME, Jan. 22, 1973, at 19.
145. 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
146. United States. v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 215.
149. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 70.
150. Barker, 514 F.2d at 216.
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table "shaking his head, frowning and staring down at his yellow legal pad
With five of the defendants having pled guilty, the number of defendants still
contesting their charges shrank to two: McCord and Liddy. After Sirica
completed the plea colloquy, the trial of McCord and Liddy resumed in earnest.
However, the prejudicial effect on the jury of five defendants suddenly
disappearing created grounds for a mistrial. As Gerald Alch, McCord's attorney,
argued, "'No instruction' . .. 'can obviate the inference that these five men have
pleaded guilty . .. after two days of deliberations to which the jury has not been
privy."' 9152
Nevertheless, Sirica decided to plough ahead. As the trial resumed, the
evidence against McCord and Liddy mounted. The police caught McCord red-
handed inside the Watergate building, and the evidence connecting Liddy to the
break-in was overwhelming. The first witness to take the stand after the other
defendants entered their guilty pleas was Thomas Gregory, a twenty-five-year-
old Brigham Young University student. Gregory testified that Hunt hired him to
spy on the campaign headquarters of Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, the early
Democratic front-runner in 1972, and South Dakota Senator George McGovern,
the eventual Democratic nominee. According to Gregory, McCord had
unsuccessfully attempted to place an eavesdropping device at McGovern
headquarters.154 Gregory also testified that he helped Hunt and Liddy surveil the
Watergate prior to the May 28 break-in.15
As the prosecution's case failed to produce evidence of a wider conspiracy,
Sirica took an increasingly assertive role. During the prosecution's examination,
four officials from the CRP-Hugh Sloan, Jeb Stuart Magruder, Robert Odle,
and Herbert Porter-testified that the CRP had given Liddy the funds recovered
on the burglars.' 6 They all insisted, however, that the funds were intended for
lawful purposes, and that the CRP had no prior knowledge of the break-in.15
When Silbert declined to probe the CRP officials further, Sirica became so
exasperated that he began questioning witnesses himself. With the CRP's
employees denying knowledge of Liddy's activities, Sirica resolved to expose the
"big cover-up" himself.'
151. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Judge Pushesfor Answers, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1973, at A7.
152. Lawrence Meyer, 4 Watergate Suspects Plead Guilty: 2 Defendants Still on Trial, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1973, at Al.
153. Id.
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156. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 73-74.
157. See id. at 74 (noting that Sloan testified that he did not know what the money was to be used for);
see also BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 239-40.
158. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 74-75 (explaining that Sirica began questioning the witnesses following
Silbert's questioning).
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Unlike the prosecutors, Sirica focused on ties between the White House, the
CRP, and Liddy. Alfred Baldwin, the government's star witness, testified
regarding Liddy and McCord's roles in the Watergate break-in, but he claimed
that he could not remember the name of McCord's contact at the CRP.159 Baldwin
revealed that, on a daily basis, he gave the logs of monitored DNC phone
conversations to McCord, who in turn personally delivered them to the CRP.""
There was one exception. Before leaving for a business trip to Miami, McCord
directed Baldwin himself to deliver the logs to the CRP offices. 16 McCord wrote
a name on the envelope for Baldwin to use, but Baldwin could not remember the
name at trial.162 Baldwin testified that he gave the envelope containing the wiretap
logs to a guard at CRP offices.' Sirica sarcastically responded, "You want the
jury to believe that you gave it to a guard, is that your testimony?"l614
Nevertheless, Sirica's questions failed to elicit additional information from
Baldwin.
The testimony of M. Douglas Caddy, a Washington lawyer, triggered a
heated dispute. Caddy testified that both Hunt and Liddy called him in the early
morning hours of June 17, 1972, to retain him as their lawyer. 6 ' The obvious
implication was that Liddy and Hunt's retention of Caddy shortly after the
burglars' arrests was not a coincidence. In response, Peter Maroulis, Liddy's
attorney, objected on the grounds that the prosecution sought to use Liddy's
exercise of his constitutional right to an attorney against him. ' Although Sirica
overruled Maroulis' objection, the judge instructed the jury to "'draw no adverse
inference' from the fact that Liddy [had] retained a lawyer . . . ."
One of the most controversial episodes of the trial occurred when Hugh
Sloan, Treasurer of the Finance Committee for the Reelection of the President,
took the stand. At the direction of Jeb Stuart Magruder, Sloan had funneled CRP
funds to Liddy prior to the Watergate break-in." Sloan also witnessed the earliest
stages of the cover-up. Hours after the police arrested the burglars, Liddy
returned to the CRP's offices to remove all the evidence he could find that tied
the CRP to the burglars."9 As Liddy later explained, there was "a lot of material
in my office that was now white-hot and had to be destroyed immediately." 7o As
159. Id. at 73; see also Meyer, Key U.S. Witness Tells of Bugging Democrats, supra note 131.
160. Lawrence Meyer, Key Witness Can't Trace Wiretap Log, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1973, at Al.
161. Id.
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168. MAGRUDER, supra note 28, at 198-99, 222-23.
169. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 248.
170. Id.
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he carried documents to the shredding machine, he bumped into Sloan. 7 ' Liddy
warned the CRP Treasurer, "Our boys got caught last night." 12 Referring to
McCord, a CRP employee, Liddy added, "It was my mistake and I used someone
from here, something I told them I'd never do."'
On the witness stand, Sloan testified that he did not know what Liddy meant
when he said that the "'boys got caught last night." 174 Liddy himself later
recalled "Sloan looked bewildered" by the reference to "our boys."'7 Although
Liddy refused to testify during the trial, he subsequently confirmed that Sloan
had no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. 1
Nevertheless, Sirica did not buy Sloan's story. "With Sloan still on the stand,
I realized that if I didn't step in fast, this whole parade would go by, right out of
the courthouse, laughing at us[,J" Sirica recorded in his memoirs. ' The judge
excused the jury and took over the questioning himself.' 1 He "aggressively
examined" Sloan on the question of the amount of money Sloan had given to
Liddy and the manner in which he laundered the money.19 Sirica asked Sloan a
total of forty-two questions.""o
The judge correctly surmised that authorization of the payments to Liddy had
to come from a source higher than any of the CRP witnesses. "Someone had to
know what the money was for. Liddy had to be reporting to someone. Now here
was Sloan, who had handled the money. I made up my mind very quickly, right
there, to ask him some questions myself.""' During both the judge's and the
prosecution's examination, Sloan testified that Magruder directed him to give
Liddy $199,000 in cash, but Sloan insisted that he did not know the purpose of
the payments.'" Sloan also revealed that former Attorney General John Mitchell
and former Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans had approved the payments to
Liddy.
Despite Sirica's skepticism, Sloan had testified truthfully. 114 In contrast, two
of the witnesses who Sirica declined to question-Jeb Stuart Magruder and
171. Id. at 249.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Herbert Porter-later admitted to committing perjury."' The judge had chosen
the wrong CRP official to grill. Magruder claimed that he knew nothing of
Liddy's illegal wiretapping activities against the Democrats."" He also claimed
that he hired Liddy to serve solely as the CRP's lawyer, not to engage in covert
activities.'17 Porter testified that the CRP gave Liddy $100,000 to investigate
whether radical groups planned violence during the 1972 presidential
campaign."" Neither Sirica nor the prosecutors probed Magruder and Porter's
stories.
Magruder expressed surprise at how smoothly his testimony went.189 "I went
in, took the oath, was questioned for about forty-five minutes, and left[,]"
Magruder recalled.'9' "Neither the prosecutors (and I was their witness) nor the
defense lawyers challenged my story.""' When Magruder left the stand, Liddy
smiled and winked at him.192 As Liddy scornfully observed, Sirica "swallowed
the perjury of Jeb Magruder whole but wouldn't believe poor Hugh Sloan who
was doing his best to tell the truth."19'
Three days later, Sirica decided "the jurors should have the benefit of the
[Sloan] testimony taken in their absence." 94 He believed it necessary to "read the
questions and answers to the jury so they could make their own judgments."
Both the prosecution and defense counsel objected."' Brushing aside their
concerns, Sirica explained that he feared that "Sloan might have a lapse of
memory, I don't know. I would rather read it from the record."197 The judge later
elaborated:
I exercise my judgment as a federal judge and chief judge of this court
and have done it on many occasions and in the presence of the jury
examined witnesses where I thought all the facts were not brought out by
counsel on either side. As long as I am a federal judge I will continue to
do it."8
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The judge proceeded to read to the jury from the transcript of his
interrogation of Sloan, including comments made during a bench conference with
the attorneys.199 In Young v. United States, the D.C. Circuit reversed two robbery
defendants' convictions when the record showed that the jury might have
overheard bench conferences at which the judge criticized defense counsel. In
the Watergate case, Sirica did not even bother to excise the bench conference
from the transcript presented to the jurors.' Moreover, both Sloan's testimony
and the bench conference included references to possible election law violations
2112
committed by Liddy. Liddy's indictment did not contain those alleged
violations, and thus should not have been presented to the jury.203
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals permitted trial judges to ask questions at
trial for the purposes of clarification. In United States v. Barbour, the D.C.
Circuit noted that "[a] trial judge is not 'a mere moderator' .... His participation
in the examination of witnesses may well be justified where the testimonial
presentation promotes fuzziness, as where testimony is inarticulately or
reluctantly given." 204 Furthermore, in Griffin v. United States, the court
recognized "the right of a trial judge to make proper inquiry of any witness when
he deems that the end of justice may be served thereby and for the purpose of
making the case clear to the jurors."20s
But Sirica had excused the jury before his examination of Sloan. His
questions, therefore, fell far short of Griffin's directive that such questioning be
"for the purpose of making the case clear to the jurors." The judge compounded
the error by reading the transcript of Sloan's testimony to the jurors without
giving them the benefit of live testimony to determine for themselves the
truthfulness of the witness's statements.
The D.C. Circuit barred trial judges from turning such questioning into
independent investigations of their own. Such questioning undermines judicial
impartiality and risks unduly influencing the jury. The court insisted that at all
times "the judge must remain 'a disinterested and objective participant in the
proceedings,' and principles both fundamental and indestructible in our criminal
law exhort him to hold to a minimum his questioning of witnesses in a jury
trial .206
By focusing his questions on the culpability of CRP officials who were not
named in the indictment, Sirica once again conflated judicial functions with those
of the executive branch. For example, although the prosecution was convinced
199. Liddy, 509 F.2d at 441-42 n.35.
200. 346 F.2d 793, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
201. Liddy, 509 F.2d at 438.
202. Id. at 441-42 n.35.
203. Id. at 438.
204. 420 F.2d 1319, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 402 (D.C.
Cir. 1950)).
205. 164 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
206. Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1321 (quoting Billeci, 184 F.2d at 403).
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that Sloan did not know how the money was used, Sirica repeatedly pressed the
witness on that point.20
Sirica: "You didn't question Mr. Magruder about the purpose of the
$199,000?"
Sloan: "No, sir."
Sirica: "Didn't anybody indicate what this money was to be used for?"
Sloan: "No, sir."208
Time and again Sirica returned to the question of what the CRP expected
Liddy to do with the money.
Sirica: "Did anybody indicate to you by their action or by words or deed
what this money was to be used for?"
Sloan: "No, sir."
Sirica: "You don't know what Mr. Liddy used it (the money) for?"
Sloan: "No, sir."
Sirica: "No idea?"
Sloan: "No, sir."209
Sirica's questioning of Sloan did not constitute an effort to clarify the witness
testimony. It constituted a judicial investigation, which the D.C. Circuit expressly
barred judges from engaging in. In United States v. Green, the D.C. Circuit
observed that "although a federal judge in a criminal case has the power to
participate in the examination of witnesses" to clarify matters for the jury, "this
power should be sparingly exercised." 2 10 The court added that judicial restraint is
particularly important "when the questioning is designed to elicit answers
favorable to the prosecution . . . ."211 As the court warned in Barbour,
"Interrogation of witnesses tends to assimilate the court's role with the
advocate's, and may tread over the line separating the provinces of judge and
jury."
Sirica's questions implied that McCord and Liddy were part of a larger
criminal conspiracy, which in turn signaled to the jury the judge's belief in the
defendants' guilt. Five years before the Watergate trial, the Supreme Court
207. Meyer, Liddy Indicated He Reported to 'Others', Witness Says, supra note 187.
208. Id.
209. Lawrence Meyer, Sloan Testimony is Read to Jury in Watergate Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1973,
at Al.
210. 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
211. Id.
212. United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
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emphasized that "any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not
only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias." 213
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit stressed in Barbour, "The presumption of innocence
may be jeopardized by an assumption of guilt radiated by overzealous quizzing
by the judge, and the right to fair trial may be imperiled by an apparent breach of
the atmosphere of judicial evenhandedness that should pervade the courtroom."214
In Whitaker v. McLean, the D. C. Circuit noted that "a right to be tried by a judge
who is reasonably free from bias is a part of the fundamental right to a fair
trial."215
The judge's suspicious attitude toward the defendants continued during
closing arguments. In his closing appeal to the jury, Peter Maroulis, Liddy's
attorney, asserted that the four CRP officials called to testify during the trial were
"without involvement and of course had no criminal intent."' 21 Sirica
interrupted Maroulis to declare "that if the jurors 'decide that Mr. Magruder or
Mr. Odle or Mr. Sloan are involved in this alleged conspiracy, they can do it."'217
The judge's outburst overlooked the fact that Magruder, Odle, and Sloan were
not charged in the case. Realizing his error, Sirica conceded that the CRP
officials are "'not on trial. I will grant you that."'218 Nevertheless, the judge
showed no concern that the appellate court would overturn his rulings on appeal.
At the end of the trial, he declared, "I'm not awed by the appellate courts. Let's
get that straight. All they can do is reverse me. They can't tell me how to run my
case."219
The case went to the jury on January 30, 1973. After less than ninety minutes
of deliberation, the jury found Liddy guilty on six counts and McCord guilty on
eight counts of "conspiracy, burglary, and illegal interception of oral and wire
communications." 221' The conspiracy count carried a maximum penalty of five
years in prison, the burglary counts a maximum of fifteen years, the attempted
wiretapping counts a maximum of five years, and the illegal wiretapping counts a
maximum of five years.221 McCord's two additional counts-illegal possession of
a device for eavesdropping on oral communications and illegal possession of a
device for eavesdropping on wire communications-each also carried a
-222
maximum penalty of five years.
213. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
214. Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1321.
215. 118F.2d596,596 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
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220. In re Liddy, 506 F.2d 1293, 1295 (D.C.Cir. 1974); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 339
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After the trial, Silbert told reporters "'there is no evidence of a wider
conspiracy. "223 Sirica disagreed. At the bond hearing a few days later, Sirica
warned, "I am still not satisfied that all the pertinent facts that might be
available-I say might be available-have been produced before an American
jury. "224 With the sentencing hearing pending, Sirica still had one last opportunity
to force the defendants to cooperate with investigators.
B. Sentencing
Sirica's aggressive approach to the case stunned the Nixon administration.
The White House realized that the threat of long prison sentences might spur
Hunt and McCord to cooperate with prosecutors. On February 3, 1973, four days
after the convictions of Liddy and McCord, Nixon and his aide Charles Colson
privately lamented Sirica's handling of the trial. The Oval Office taping system,
which the president had installed in 1971, the same year Liddy and Hunt
organized the White House "Plumbers," recorded their conversation.225 The
President complained that Sirica's "[g]oddamn conduct is shocking."22' He
angrily asked Colson if Sirica was currying favor with the Democrats in hopes of
gaining a Supreme Court appointment in the future.227 "No. No[,]" Colson
answered. "Sirica is a tough, hard-boiled law-and-order judge."22 Noting that
Sirica was a Republican, Colson exclaimed, "I can't understand what he's doing
.... The only thing that I can figure is that he-this case just got under his craw
for some reason, and he is a hot-headed Italian . . . ."229
Cognizant of Sirica's reputation for imposing long-sentences and chastened
by the judge's aggressive intervention during the trial, the burglars demanded
more money for their silence. Hunt insisted that the White House pay him
$72,000 for personal expenses and $50,000 for his attorneys' fees.210 He also
issued a public warning to the White House. "A team out on an unorthodox
mission expects resupply, it expects concern and attention[,J" Hunt told Time
Magazine.231 "The team should never get the feeling they're abandoned."232 On
March 21, 1973, John Dean warned Nixon, "We have a cancer-within-close to
the Presidency, that's growing."23 When Dean suggested that paying off the
223. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 335.
224. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 88.
225. AMBROSE, THE TRRI MPH OF A POLITICIAN, supra note 13, at 423.
226. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 60, at 204.
227. Id.
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230. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1976); KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER, supra note 60, at
253.
231. Trials: The Spy in the Cold, TIME, Jan. 29, 1972, at 17.
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burglars could cost $1 million, Nixon replied, "We could get that."234 As his
willingness to bribe the burglars demonstrated, the President understood the
increasingly dire nature of the White House's predicament.
Congress got involved one week after McCord and Liddy's convictions. On
February 7, 1973, the Senate established the Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities.235 Although it had a broad charter to investigate the entire
1972 presidential campaign, the Senate committee quickly focused on the
216Watergate break-in. Prior to the burglars' sentencing, however, the Senate
investigation went nowhere. As minority counsel Fred Thompson observed, the
Senate committee had failed to produce evidence that Watergate was "something
more than a 'third-rate burglary . . ..
Senate investigators recognized that the burglars offered the best opportunity
to break the case open. To that end, the Senate committee's chief lawyer tried to
influence Sirica's approach to the burglars' sentencing. Before the hearing,
Georgetown law professor Sam Dash, majority counsel for the Senate Watergate
committee, met privately with Judge Sirica. Conscious of the impropriety of the
Senate coordinating its efforts with the trial judge, Dash insisted that his purpose
was merely to discuss unrelated matters with Sirica.238 But in his ex parte meeting
with Sirica, Dash made a point of bringing to the judge's attention the
unheralded-but in Dash's opinion, highly significant-case of United States v.
Sweig.7 "When I met with Sirica I was careful to emphasize I was not
recommending anything regarding his sentencing of the Watergate defendants,"
Dash later wrote, "but I expressed the hope that one of them might give us
information about the cover-up and I referred him to the Sweig case."240
In United States v. Sweig, the Second Circuit held that the court could
2411
consider at sentencing a defendant's failure to cooperate with investigators.
Martin Sweig was an administrative assistant to Rep. John McCormack of
Massachusetts, the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the 1960s and
early 1970s.24 2 Prosecutors brought corruption charges against Sweig, but the jury
only found him guilty of one count of perjury. The trial judge sentenced Sweig
to thirty months behind bars, citing Sweig's "failure to cooperate with
government officials in their investigation of influence peddling," in the House of
234. Id. at 254.
235. SAMUEL DASH, CHIEF COUNSEL: INSIDE THE ERVIN COMMITTEE-THE UNTOLD STORY OF
WATERGATE 8 (1976).
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COMMITTEE 195 (1975).
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Representatives. However, if Sweig changed his mind and cooperated with
prosecutors, the judge offered to "leave the door open for a reduction of sentence
"1245
On appeal, Sam Dash, Sweig's attorney, contended that the judge's use of his
sentencing power to coerce cooperation with investigators violated Sweig's right
'46
against self-incrimination.26 The Second Circuit dismissed Sweig's argument in a
short opinion. The appellate court emphasized that the "sentencing judge has
very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits .... " 247
In Sweig, the Second Circuit relied heavily on its ruling in United States v.
Vermeulen.248 In Vermeulen, the defendant, a French national, had pleaded guilty
to the use of a fake passport and to making false statements in a U.S. Customs
declaration.249 At sentencing, the judge inquired as to why the defendant had
repeatedly entered the United States under various aliases rather than under his
own name, but the defendant declined to answer.2" After informing the defendant
that "'he might be able to get some help in the reduction"' of his sentence if he
cooperated with investigators, the trial judge imposed consecutive five-year
sentences.251
On appeal, Vermeulen contended that the court had imposed consecutive
sentences to coerce him to cooperate with investigators in violation of his right
252
against self-incrimination. The Second Circuit disagreed. It held that the
"sentencing Court did not impose a 'price tag' on appellant's constitutional
privilege to remain silent." 2 Although the trial court inquired into whether the
defendant "wished to cooperate with the public authorities by giving
information . . . regarding others involved in illegal international narcotics
traffic[,]" the defendant remained silent without invoking his Fifth Amendment
right. 4 The Second Circuit concluded that because "the Fifth Amendment
privilege was never raised" during the trial court proceedings, the defendant
could not belatedly claim that his constitutional rights were violated.
By his own admission, Dash hoped that by bringing Sirica's attention to
Sweig he could influence the outcome of the Watergate sentencing hearing. As he
stressed to Sirica, a long sentence could inspire at least one of the burglars to
244. Id. at 181-82.
245. Id. at 184.
246. DASH, supra note 237, at 26.
247. Sweig, 454 F.2d at 183.
248. Id. at 184.
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"give us [the Senate committee] information about the cover-up
According to Dash, Sirica responded by saying that "he understood the
committee was not making any request of him, as it had no right to do, and that
he would study all the law and would sentence as he determined the interests of
justice required.",2 In fact, Sirica was already planning to impose severe
sentences. "I scheduled March 23 as the day the defendants would reappear in
my court to find out what time they would have to serve for their crimes[,]" the
judge recalled.2 "I knew right away that I would give all seven men fairly stiff
sentences; for the next month and a half, I thought about just how to go about
sentencing them . ...
According to Sirica, his friend Clark Mollenhoff, the Washington
correspondent for the Des Moines Register, brought Sirica's attention to the
practice of provisional sentencing. Under provisional, or conditional,
sentencing, judges could give defendants a few months to ponder their sentence
before it became final. Mollenhoff suggested that such an approach might
encourage the Watergate burglars to cooperate with prosecutors .2' "The idea of
delaying sentencing further and making the sentences conditional on some show
of co-operation appealed to me[,]" Sirica explained.26
There was one crucial aspect to provisional sentencing: the applicable federal
statute-18 U.S.C. § 4205(c)-directed that all provisional sentences "shall be
deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by
law . . . ." The statute created a three-month window, extendable for up to a
total of six months, for the Bureau of Prisons to prepare a report to the judge on
all facts pertinent to sentencing.264 After receiving the Bureau's sentencing
recommendations, the judge had discretionary authority to do one of three things:
place the prisoner on probation; reduce the length of the provisional sentence; or,
most ominously for the Watergate defendants, "affirm the sentence of
imprisonment originally imposed"-that is, impose the maximum sentence
permissible under the law . As Sirica later explained, "That law gave me a legal
way to put off final sentencing until I could see just how well the defendants co-
operated in the pending investigation.",26
The fact that investigators and journalists directly lobbied Sirica in an effort
to influence his sentencing decision did not faze the judge. Apparently, he saw
256. DASH, supra note 237, at 27.
257. Id.
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nothing improper in his consultations with outside parties. The fact was the judge
welcomed any recommendation that would aid in his efforts to pressure the
defendants to talk. "None of the defendants had made any move toward telling
the full truth about the crime[,]" the judge emphasized.261 "I began to wonder if,
given a bit more time now that all seven had either pleaded guilty or been found
guilty, they might reconsider their defiant stance."
The judge seemed to have a keen understanding of human psychology. As he
suspected, fear of long prison sentences unnerved the burglars. Hunt demanded
that the administration intervene to secure his release. "2 As a House Judiciary
Committee investigation later revealed, "Hunt was very worried that Judge Sirica
would give him a long jail sentence."'27 After conferring with President Nixon,
White House aide Charles Colson assured Hunt that the President would grant
him clemency. James McCord made similar demands. Conditions in the
notorious District of Columbia Jail appalled him.272 In February, while the
Watergate burglars awaited sentencing, two inmates stabbed a guard in the
cellblock adjoining McCord's. 27 Even the stoical Liddy described the D.C. Jail as
a violent, riot-prone facility marked by "a state of neglect, disrepair,
overcrowding, and filth . . . . According to Liddy, prison officials admitted
that the D.C. Jail "was not fit for human habitation."275 Although Liddy
maintained his silence, the prospect of a long prison stay on behalf of protecting
Richard Nixon's presidency had no appeal for McCord. His cellmate Liddy
suspected that "McCord was becoming unhinged by the pressure of events and
imprisonment. ,276 In a letter to the White House, McCord warned that "'all the
trees in the forest will tumble"' if he faced a long prison stay.
McCord made good on his threat. On March 20, three days before the
218
sentencing hearing, he delivered a letter to Judge Sirica's chambers. It was the
ultimate political-and legal-bombshell. In the letter, McCord declared, "There
was political pressure applied to the defendants to plead guilty and remain
silent."279 McCord informed the judge that witnesses had lied under oath:
"Perjury occurred during the trial in matters highly material to the very structure,
267. Id. at 89.
268. Id.
269. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that Hunt wanted a
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orientation, and impact of the government's case, and to the motivation and
intent of the defendants.",2o Furthermore, he revealed that the "Watergate
operation" included more than the seven named defendants and closed the letter
by asking Sirica for "the opportunity to talk with you privately in chambers."2 81
McCord's letter ensured that the Watergate scandal would not end with the
burglars' trial.
To add to the drama, Sirica read McCord's letter aloud during the sentencing
hearing. He then imposed draconian sentences on the burglars. He sentenced
Liddy to twenty years in prison; the former FBI agent would not be eligible for
parole until he had served a minimum of six years and eight months behind
bars.2" Unlike the other defendants, who received provisional sentences, Liddy
received a final sentence. 84 During the trial, Liddy had shown nothing but disdain
for Judge Sirica, describing the judge's handling of the proceedings as
"something one would expect in a Marx Brothers movie, not a United States
District Court." Judge Sirica reciprocated Liddy's animosity. In his
autobiography, Sirica revealed that Liddy's "smart-alecky, cocky" attitude during
the trial "annoyed me no end."
However, for the other defendants, Sirica took the unique approach of
combining provisional sentences, which Mollenhoff had recommended, with the
offer of early release for cooperative defendants, which Dash had suggested. The
judge provisionally sentenced Hunt to the maximum of thirty-five years in prison
and he provisionally sentenced the four Cubans-Barker, Sturgis, Martinez, and
Gonzalez-to the maximum of forty years behind bars. 2 The sentence, Hunt
later revealed, "was so over and beyond anything I had conceived possible that I
sat in stunned, nauseated silence." 288 After announcing the sentences, Sirica
warned the defendants, "I may also properly suggest to you that in the interval
... [before the imposition of final sentences] you give serious consideration to
lending your full cooperation to investigating authorities."2 89 In his decision,
Sirica cited Sweig and Vermeulen as precedent for his extraordinary use of the
sentencing power.
The sentences were absurdly out of proportion to the crime. The defendants
had been convicted of breaking and entering for the purposes of eavesdropping.
The target of the break in was an office building, not a private dwelling. The
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burglars did not carry guns, and they did not resist arrest. Normally, those factors
would have weighed in favor of, at most, a sentence of moderate length.
Nevertheless, Sirica imposed on the Watergate defendants sentences longer than
some murderers receive. It was an extraordinary exercise of judicial discretion in
sentencing.
These sentences were also in blatant defiance of appellate court mandates.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had repeatedly overturned sentences that
punished defendants for exercising their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
and their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. One of the cases involved none
other than Sirica himself. In Scott v. United States, an eighteen-year-old
defendant was convicted of robbing a bus driver with a toy pistol.291 Frustrated by
the defendant's refusal to plead guilty, Sirica imposed a five-to-fifteen-year-
prison sentence, declaring at sentencing, "If you had pleaded guilty to this
offense, I might have been more lenient with you." 292 Sirica had placed the
defendant in an impossible quandary: if the defendant consented to Sirica's
demands and pleaded guilty, he would get a shorter sentence but at the cost of
forfeiting his right to appeal. Conversely, if the defendant preserved his right to
appeal by maintaining his plea of not guilty, he would be punished with a longer
prison sentence. Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, it overturned the sentence imposed by Sirica and remanded for
resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that "the defendant paid a price for
demanding a trial."29 Sirica, the appellate court concluded, had placed an
indefensible "pricetag" on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to a
trial by his peers. 94
Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns applied with as much force to Hunt and
the Cubans as to Liddy and McCord. Although Hunt and the Cubans had pleaded
guilty to charges related to the Watergate break-in, they knew that if they
cooperated with the prosecution, they likely faced additional criminal liability.
For example, at Hunt's direction, Barker and Martinez had burglarized Dr.
Fielding's office. The Watergate defendants had been involved in other activities,
unknown to prosecutors that could have led to additional charges. Prior to
sentencing, the U.S. Attorney's Office had not offered immunity to any of the
defendants. As Earl Silbert later explained, the prosecution's strategy was to
secure convictions and prison sentences first, and then attempt to get the
defendants to talk by offering immunity. 2' Therefore, at the time that Sirica
imposed his coercive sentences, all of the defendants faced the very real risk of
self-incrimination if they cooperated with investigators.
291. See 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Ironically, Sirica might not have been in a position to impose such severe
sentences if the defendants had known of a key fact suppressed by prosecutors. In
the days after the Watergate break-in, the FBI conducted a search of the DNC's
offices, but failed to turn up evidence of wiretaps.296 During a two-day search on
June 29 and 30, 1972, the FBI's technical team found no eavesdropping
equipment on any of the DNC's telephones. ' Dismayed by the FBI's failure,
Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert demanded that the FBI conduct another
search. On September 13, during the second search, the FBI found a device on
the telephone of Spencer Oliver, a DNC employee at the Watergate.2 Silbert
concluded that the FBI had missed the device during its first sweep in June.
However, the FBI disagreed, and insisted in an internal report to the U.S.
Attorney's Office that the September bug was not present during the June 29-30
search.299
After the trial, McCord admitted that the bug found at the Watergate in
September 1972 was placed by his team during the May 28 Watergate break-in..o.
In fact, one of the bugs placed on a DNC phone in May 1972, remained
undetected until April 1973, when McCord revealed its location to
investigators."
But McCord did not make that admission until months after his conviction.
During the trial, prosecutors did not have conclusive proof that the bug found in
September 1972 was placed there by McCord's team. Instead, they had an FBI
report that adamantly denied that the bug found in September 1972 was present
during the FBI's search of the Watergate in June 1972. At a minimum, therefore,
the FBI's report would have offered a defense to the charges of illegal
interception of electronic and oral communications. The police had found
eavesdropping devices on the burglars, which may have been enough to support
attempted wiretapping charges. But the lack of evidence of actual wiretapping
would have enhanced the burglars' defense as well as reduced the maximum
sentences available to Sirica.
Nevertheless, the prosecutors declined to provide the FBI's report on the
June 1972 search to defense counsel, or even to inform them of its existence.
The issue did not surface publicly until the mid-1980s, a decade after Watergate,
after the journalist Jim Hougan gained access to the FBI's files through the
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Freedom of Information Act."m When asked about the issue at an academic
conference at Hofstra University, Silbert acknowledged that he did not alert
defense counsel to the existence of the FBI report."" However, in his defense, he
pointed out that the burglars' attorneys never asked for the evidence, an
unsurprising fact since they did not know of its existence." He made the same
point when questioned on the matter by the journalist Phil Stanford."
Although the failure to volunteer the Watergate report to the defendants
would clearly constitute prosecutorial misconduct today, the rules governing
exculpatory evidence were much more ambiguous in 1973. Then, and now, the
guiding case was Brady v. Maryland, which gave rise to the famous "Brady
Rule.",3111 In Brady, Maryland prosecutors withheld from a murder defendant the
fact that one of his co-defendants had already confessed to the murder with
which the defendant was charged.'" The United States Supreme Court held that
the prosecution's suppression of evidence of the co-defendant's confession
violated Brady's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" The Supreme Court concluded, "We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Thus, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Brady, prosecutors had a duty to offer
exculpatory evidence requested by the defendant.
Not until 1976-three years after the Watergate trial-would the Supreme
Court definitively expand the Brady Rule to require prosecutors to volunteer
exculpatory evidence otherwise unknown to the defendant. In United States v.
Agurs, the Court held that if the prosecution possesses evidence that "is so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made.",11
However, in 1973, the year the burglars went on trial, the extent of the
prosecution's duty to volunteer evidence to the defendant was unclear.m Agurs
304. See HOUGAN, supra note 22, at 244-52 (examining Hougan's discovery of the materials).
305. WATERGATE & AFTERWARD, supra note 315, at 43, 48; see also Stanford, supra note 40, at 48.
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307. Stanford, supra note 40, at 48.
308. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
309. Id. at 84.
310. Id. at 86.
311. Id. at 87.
312. 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The literature on Brady and Agurs is extensive. See, e.g., Barbara Allen
Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1133 (1982); Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CI. L.
REV. 1673 (1996); Stephen P. Jones, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence,
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735 (1995).
313. See Notes & Comments, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 145 (1964) ("Having recognized the prosecutor's constitutional duty to reveal
evidence to the defendant the courts must now formulate standards to determine what kinds of evidence must be
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itself arose from a District of Columbia case. When Agurs reached the Court of
Appeals, the D.C. Circuit observed, "No clear consensus exists among the courts
on the question of whether, in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, a defense
request is necessary to trigger the prosecution's duty to reveal possibly
exculpatory information in its possession."34 Thus, at the time of the burglars'
trial, the prosecutors were within the letter, but certainly not the spirit of the law
when they declined to share the FBI's report with the defendants."'
IV. THE AFTERMATH
A. The Wall of Silence Breaks
Sirica's use of his discretionary sentencing power sent shock waves through
the White House. During a March 23, 1973 meeting with Nixon that was
captured for posterity by the Oval Office taping system, National Security
Adviser Henry Kissinger lamented, "Where are the civil libertarians? Here the
judge gives somebody a 55-year sentence in order to make him talk. Where is the
protection of the Fifth Amendment?"'16 In contrast to his confidence before the
trial, Nixon conceded to Kissinger that the Watergate investigation "is a
worry ."
Notwithstanding the deeply problematic nature of Sirica's use of his
sentencing power, the means he chose had the desired effect. Had Sirica taken a
passive role in the case, it is entirely possible that the Watergate scandal would
have ended with the trial, and Richard Nixon would have served as president
until January 1977, when his second term expired. Instead, Sirica's coercive
approach breached the wall of silence. As Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee
explained, the drama in Judge Sirica's courtroom on March 23, 1973, set in
motion the events that ultimately led to Nixon's resignation. "[T]wo men made
sure that Watergate would never die, and that Richard Nixon himself was going
to pay a fearful price for his role in it[,]" Bradlee later related.3'" "The first was
Judge John Sirica, and the second was James W. McCord, Jr." , One of the
revealed.").
314. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
315. On the purpose of the Brady Rule see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)
The Brady Rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to displace the
adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage
of justice does not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense
counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial[.]
Id.
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cover-up's key architects agreed. Jeb Stuart Magruder later lamented, "Judge
Sirica, by threatening the Watergate defendants with long sentences, had cracked
one of them, and that was the beginning of the end for the cover-up. Except for
Judge Sirica, I think the cover-up might have held."3201
One hour after the sentencing hearing, McCord and his attorney met with
Sam Dash.3' As McCord later related, "I told Dash of my desire to cooperate
with him and to give him my full knowledge on the Watergate operation and its
aftermath . ... The next day McCord revealed that Magruder and John Dean
had participated in the Watergate conspiracy.
On Monday, March 26, the Los Angeles Times broke the news that McCord
had implicated Dean and Magruder.324 Both of them realized that the first senior
White House aide to cooperate with investigators would get the most favorable
treatment at sentencing. As Stanley Kutler explained, the stress of the moment
",proved too much for John Dean, who could cope no longer; the dominoes he
had imagined had begun to totter. He had to let it all hang out." In early April,
Dean's attorney approached Watergate prosecutors on Dean's behalf to discuss
plea terms .326 Dean revealed his own role in the cover-up, and later implicated the
President as well.'. On April 14, Magruder and his attorneys also met with
prosecutors.328 The administration reeled as public furor over the scandal built. In
late April, White House Chief of Staff Robert Haldeman, presidential aide John
Ehrlichman, and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst all resigned under the
threat of impending criminal indictments.329 The Senate subpoenaed the
President's entire domestic inner circle, including Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and
Mitchell, to testify before the Watergate investigative committee.3o The cover-up
was in full collapse. As the historian and journalist Theodore White later
observed, in April 1973, "Richard Nixon passed his point of no return."
Nixon would fight on for more than a year, but his presidency was fatally
damaged. In May 1973, Elliot Richardson, the new Attorney General, appointed
Harvard Law professor Archibald Cox as the Watergate special prosecutor.'" The
320. MAGRUDER, supra note 28, at 284.
321. DASH, supra note 237, at 31.
322. MCCORD, supra note 33, at 62.
323. DASH, Supra note 237, at 34-35.
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MCCORD, supra note 33, at 56-57.
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327. Id. at 235-37, 239-41, 256-57, 282-83, 307-27; see also BEN-VENISTE & FRAMPTON, supra note
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328. J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 309 (1999); see also
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Watergate Special Prosecution Force, headed by Cox, replaced Silbert's team.
In late spring, the Senate Select Committee began live, televised hearings. 4 The
hearings soon gave rise to another bombshell when White House aide Alexander
Butterfield informed Senate investigators of the existence of an Oval Office
taping system.' Butterfield's revelation sealed the administration's fate. It put
investigators on notice of the existence of evidence that could incontrovertibly
confirm the President's role in the cover-up.
For the remainder of 1973, and most of 1974, the battle between
investigators and the White House centered on Cox's efforts to subpoena key
Oval Office audiotapes. At Cox's request, Judge Sirica issued a subpoena
ordering President Nixon to produce the tapes for in camera inspection by the
court.' Nixon refused and appealed the decision."' The administration claimed
that the separation of powers, and in particular the doctrine of executive
privilege, barred the judicial branch from enforcing a subpoena against the
President of the United States. Meanwhile, on a Saturday afternoon in October
1973, Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson to fire Cox."" Both
Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, resigned rather than execute
the President's order."9 Later that night, Solicitor General Robert Bork ended the
constitutional crisis by firing Cox.340
Although Nixon had succeeded in removing Cox, the "Saturday Night
Massacre" devastated what was left of the President's reputation. An NBC poll
found that seventy-five percent of the country opposed Cox's firing; a Gallup
poll revealed that Nixon's approval rating had sunk to seventeen percent.341 Soon
after, the House of Representatives began impeachment hearings. Even worse for
the President, Cox's replacement, Leon Jaworski, proved equally determined to
subpoena the incriminating Oval Office audiotapes.3 In July 1974, the Supreme
Court ended the deadlock by affirming the trial court's order that the Nixon
Administration hand over the subpoenaed audiotapes.3 The subpoenaed tapes
included the "smoking gun" tape that proved beyond doubt Nixon's personal
involvement in obstructing the Watergate investigation. The President's position
supra note 5, at 330.
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became untenable. As Congress prepared to vote on three articles of
impeachment, Nixon resigned from office on August 9, 1974.'
B. The Court of Appeals' Review of Sirica's Handling of the Trial
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the convictions of
Liddy and McCord.3 In United States v. McCord and United States v. Liddy, the
court found only harmless errors in Sirica's handling of the proceedings. In
McCord, Chief Judge Bazelon wrote the opinion for the unanimous court. "A
superficial review of these events might support the inference that at least Judge
Sirica communicated an appearance of inquisitorial attitude inconsistent with
notions of a fair trial[,J" Bazelon observed.346 "However, such a view assumes an
exceedingly narrow interpretation of the responsibilities of a trial judge."347
The crux of the court's ruling lay in the D.C. Circuit's endorsement of
Sirica's interventionist role in the trial. "No judge should remain aloof while the
prosecution ignores important evidence . . . []" the chief judge stressed.348
Bazelon even went so far as to liken the judge's role to that of the prosecutor.
"The judge, like the prosecutor in this respect, is not a passive by-stander in the
arena of justice, a spectator at a 'sporting event;' rather he or she has the most
pressing affirmative responsibility to see that justice is done in every case." 49 In a
footnote, Bazelon quoted from a Stanford Law Review article that expressly
rejected the umpire analogy: "Despite the tendency to describe the American
judge as passive or neutral, he is plainly more than a 'mere umpire.'"
As a philosophical matter, the D.C. Circuit conceded the need for restraints
on the scope of the judge's authority to intervene. "There are, to be sure, strict
limits on the judge's power to intervene in the conduct of the trial, particularly in
the examination of witnesses and the order of presentation of evidence[,]"
Bazelon observed.' "These limits are premised on the primary role of counsel in
the formulation of trial strategy and on the rule that the judge should not
communicate to the jury an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused."3
However, Bazelon offered only the vaguest description of the standard courts
should apply when taking an active role in the proceedings: "When a trial judge
intervenes in the conduct of a trial, we must determine whether the intervention is
344. AMBROSE, RUIN & RECOVERY, supra note 128, at 438.
345. 509 F.2d 334, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
346. Id. at 347.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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350. Id. at 347 n.41 (quoting A Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Thenes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1974)).
351. Id. at 347-48.
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in pursuit of justice and whether that intervention is consistent with the premises
of the limits on intervention.""'
The D.C. Circuit ruled that Sirica's pursuit of justice did not run afoul of
limits on the court's authority to intervene. "Judge Sirica's conduct of McCord's
trial was consonant with these standards[,]" Bazelon concluded.3 The court held
that the "reading of Sloan's testimony and the examination that preceded it were
a proper exercise of the judicial function." Moreover, Sirica's use of
provisional sentencing had no prejudicial effect on the jury, since a guilty verdict
had already been entered against McCord. "In sum," the court concluded, "there
was no prejudice to McCord by reason of Judge Sirica's conduct of the trial.
McCord's contention that he deserves a new trial on that ground is without
merit."01 In all, Judge Bazelon devoted only three paragraphs of the court's
opinion to Judge Sirica's conduct of the trial.
Likewise, in United States v. Liddy, the D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed
Liddy's conviction.' Liddy had appealed his conviction on a number of grounds,
including Sirica's failure to individually examine the jurors during voir dire, the
judge's personal questioning of government witnesses, and the judge's reading to
the jury of testimony that included comments made by the attorneys during bench
conferences.
The court held that Sirica did not err when he admitted testimony that Liddy
had resigned from the CRP because of his refusal to cooperate with the FBI.""
Liddy's counsel contended that the admission of such testimony into the record
violated Liddy's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.3' The Court
of Appeals disagreed. Writing for the court, Judge Leventhal observed, "It was
within the discretion of the trial judge to hold that the statement . . . [by Liddy
regarding his reasons for resigning from the CRP] was admissible to establish his
consciousness of guilt." 62
Judge Leventhal conceded that Sirica's direct questioning of witnesses was
disfavored. "Sound and accepted doctrine teaches that the trial judge should
avoid extensive questioning of the witness and should rely on counsel to develop
testimony for the jury's consideration.""" Leventhal also warned that direct
353. Id.
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357. Id. at 346-48.
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questioning could adversely affect a trial judge's objectivity. 4 He acknowledged
that Sirica:
[N]ot only failed to seek an alternative to personal intervention, he
declined the prosecutor's request to elicit the additional testimony by
further questioning of Sloan in the jury's presence. . . . The problems are
certainly not resolved by the trial judge's comment that Sloan "might
have a lapse of memory, I don't know."
Nevertheless, Leventhal concluded that Sirica's direct questioning "did not
infringe upon the requirement of [a] fair trial.",6 ' Leventhal praised Sirica's active
role in the case. "The precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not require a
judge to be inert." 6 Like Sirica, Leventhal insisted that a trial judge's role went
well beyond that of an umpire. "The trial judge is properly governed by the
interest of justice and truth, and is not compelled to act as if he were merely
presiding at a sporting match. He is not a 'mere moderator."'
But Leventhal's opinion failed to acknowledge the obvious fact that
responsibility rests with the prosecution, not the judge, to pursue "justice and
truth." Under the American system of adversarial criminal proceedings, the state
investigates and prosecutes crimes before a neutral judge and impartial jury.69
Judges have neither the duty, nor the authority, to investigate crimes themselves.
The D.C. Circuit's failure to apply its previous rulings limiting judicial
activism is telling. It suggests that the prevailing political winds of the day had a
significant impact on how the D.C. Circuit viewed the Watergate trial. By the
time the case reached the Court of Appeals in June 1974, the Nixon
Administration was in its death throes. The judges on the D.C. Circuit knew that
evidence of the administration's criminality might never have come to light
without Sirica's intervention in the trial. Moreover, Sirica's emergence as a
national folk hero in 1973 made clear to the appellate courts, and the White
House, that the public overwhelmingly approved of the judge's tactics. The
appellate court itself hinted that the political implications of the trial were central
to its holding. The Watergate case, the D.C. Circuit noted, "involves the integrity
of the nation's political system . . . .,"m As a result, Leventhal concluded:
Judge Sirica's palpable search for truth in such a trial was not only
permissible, it was in the highest tradition of his office as a federal judge.
364. Id. at 440-41 n.31.
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And although his execution of this objective presented problems, as must
be acknowledged, they were not of a kind that deprived defendants of a
fair trial.
In summary, Leventhal announced, "'A defendant is entitled to a fair
trial but not a perfect one.'"
The D.C. Circuit failed to see the irony in the fact that Sirica's "ends-justify-
the-means" attitude was precisely the same mentality that brought down the
Nixon White House. The conclusion is inescapable that, by affirming Sirica's
abusive tactics, the D.C. Circuit failed in its duty to preserve the integrity and
fairness of federal criminal proceedings in the District of Columbia. The D.C.
Circuit was not alone in this failing. Despite the fundamental constitutional
questions raised by Sirica's tactics, and despite the trial's pressing national
importance, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari petitions filed by
Liddy and McCord.
Understandably, Sirica delighted in the D.C. Circuit's rulings on McCord and
Liddy's convictions. After so many reversals during his career by the Court of
Appeals, Sirica took enormous satisfaction from the fact that the D.C. Circuit
affirmed him in the most important trial of his career. In his autobiography,
Sirica printed a long excerpt from Judge Leventhal's opinion in the Liddy
appeal. Sirica interpreted the D.C. Circuit's decision as not only a vindication
of his handling of the Watergate trial, but also as an endorsement of an
investigative role for trial court judges. As Sirica put it, "The opinion written by
Judge Leventhal seems to me to protect the role of an active and fair judicial
system.",
C. The Sentencing Issue
Ironically, although Sirica's use of coercive sentences was the most
controversial aspect of the trial, it received virtually no attention from the D.C.
Circuit. The reason was simple: the issue was rendered moot for all but one of the
defendants.
In November 1973, Hunt and the burglars appeared before Judge Sirica for
final sentencing.' To a remarkable extent, Sirica had achieved his goal of getting
the defendants to cooperate with prosecutors and Senate investigators. There was
no longer any need to compel them to testify. Moreover, as Judge Sirica later
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admitted, he "never had any intention whatsoever of putting those men in jail for
thirty to forty years.
At final sentencing, Sirica slashed the prison terms he had assigned at the
provisional hearing. He reduced Hunt's term to a minimum of thirty months and
a maximum of eight years. . He sentenced Barker to a minimum of eighteen
months and a maximum of six years)' He gave Gonzalez, Martinez, and Sturgis
each sentences of one to four years. 8 Finally, he sentenced McCord to one to
five years behind bars."' Sirica subsequently reduced the sentences even more. In
the end, only one of the Watergate burglars served more than fourteen months in
prison for the break-in.
The one exception was G. Gordon Liddy. In May 1975, Liddy petitioned
Sirica for a reduction of his twenty-year sentence . Sirica emphatically denied
it.384 The judge emphasized that Liddy:
[H]as not show[n] the Court the slightest remorse or regret for his
actions, and has not given the Court even a hint of contrition or sorrow,
nor has he made any attempt to compensate for his illegal actions by
trying to aid our system of justice in its search for the truth.
When Liddy appealed Sirica's denial of his petition, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, but issued no opinion. * Yet, in his denial of Liddy's
sentence reduction petition, Sirica expressly cited Liddy's failure "to aid our
system of justice in its search for the truth" as one of the reasons for the petition's
denial. At a minimum, the serious legal and constitutional issues raised by
Liddy deserved a written opinion by the D.C. Circuit. Nevertheless, four months
later, the Supreme Court denied Liddy's petition for certiorari."
Finally, in April 1977, President Carter commuted Liddy's sentence."9 The
former FBI agent was released from a federal prison in Connecticut after five
years behind bars .
The only appellate judge who wrote an opinion on Sirica's use of the
sentencing power to force the burglars to talk was D.C. Circuit Judge
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MacKinnon. Judge MacKinnon addressed the issue in his dissenting opinion in
Mitchell v. Sirica.9' Mitchell involved a petition for writ of mandamus filed by
former Nixon aides John Mitchell, Robert Ehrlichman, Kenneth Parkinson,
Gordon Strachan, and Charles Colson, all of whom were indicted by the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force. As chief judge for the District of
Columbia, Sirica assigned the case to himself.i In light of Sirica's prominent
role in the Watergate burglars' trial, the White House aides petitioned the D.C.
Circuit to order Sirica to disqualify himself as the presiding judge at their trial. 94
They maintained that Sirica's role in the burglars' trial, and his public statements
indicating White House involvement in the cover-up, precluded him from
impartially presiding over their case.
Without hearing oral argument or writing an opinion, the D.C. Circuit denied
the defendants' petition.3' However, in a vigorous dissent, Judge MacKinnon
chastised his fellow judges for treating the appellants so dismissively. The five
judges in the majority, MacKinnon wrote, "completely deny petitioners a hearing
in this court and then by a mere order without any written opinion, in effect deny
petitioners their most fundamental rights.""9 In MacKinnon's view, the
allegations merited an evidentiary hearing on the petitioners' claims. He
observed:
[That Sirica's actions] in repeatedly interrogating witnesses concerning
the involvement of others, in using the sentencing process to coerce
testimony implicating higher officials, and in suggesting further grand
jury inquiry of named individuals including a defendant here, publicly
demonstrated an accusatory frame of mind that connected the present
defendants to the crime with which they are now charged-obstructing
the prosecution of the Watergate break-in.
MacKinnon's dissent included a review of Sirica's use of his sentencing
power to coerce the burglars to testify against Nixon's staff. MacKinnon took
particular exception to the "extremely harsh sentences" that Sirica had
provisionally imposed.399
391. 502 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
392. Id. at 376 n.2.
393. See id. at 377 (noting that the defendant's filed for a writ of mandamus ordering Sirica's
disqualification); see also LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE
104 (1976).
394. Id. at 376-77.
395. Id. at 378.
396. Id. at 376.
397. Id. at 376 (MacKinnon, dissenting).
398. Id. at 385 (MacKinnon, dissenting)
399. Id. at 384 n. 17 (MacKinnon, dissenting).
384
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
MacKinnon pointed out that the federal sentencing statute upon which Sirica
relied:
[W]as intended to aid the court in determining a proper sentence and not
to aid the prosecutor through duress of the prisoner, in obtaining
evidence of other offenses. There is nothing in either the language of the
statute or its legislative history that indicates it was intended to be used
*400to compel testimony.
Most important of all, MacKinnon argued that Sirica had misapplied the
Sweig and Vermeulen precedents. "The Sweig and Vermeulen decisions were
instances where a lighter sentence than the offense justified was held out as
inducement to the prisoner if he testified[,]" the judge noted.401 "There is nothing
improper in this. But this does not justify the imposition of a harsher sentence
than the offense calls for, or the threat of such a sentence, because the prisoner
refuses to disclose information the judge thinks he should." 402
This was a critical point, one ignored by Sirica. In both Sweig and
Vermeulen, the trial judges attempted to entice the defendants to talk by offering
shorter sentences than normal for the crimes they were convicted of committing.
In contrast, in the Watergate case, Sirica imposed outlandish sentences-far
longer than the crimes merited-in order to force the defendants to talk. Sweig
and Vermeulen involved conserving the government's resources by reducing
sentences, whereas Sirica's approach enhanced sentences for the purpose of
coercing cooperation with authorities. The end result of Sirica's approach was
fundamentally different than that of the Sweig and Vermeulen cases. Thus, rather
than constituting precedential authority for Sirica's actions, Sweig and Vermeulen
served as nothing more than a disingenuous justification for Sirica's use of
coercive sentencing.
But as a dissenting judge in a completely separate case, MacKinnon's
criticism of Sirica's methods in the burglars' trial had no effect. Moreover, the
broad discretion granted to trial court judges at sentencing insulated Sirica from
any serious scrutiny of his use of the sentencing power.
Yet, as the Scott case clearly showed, the D.C. Circuit was quite willing to
overturn sentences that violated defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
G. Gordon Liddy's sentence was a prominent exception. One cannot help but
conclude that Liddy's connection to the most notorious political scandal in
American history, his open contempt for Sirica's efforts to expose the
conspiracy, and his refusal to cooperate with prosecutors influenced the D.C.
Circuit's view of his appeal. As revelations of the Nixon Administration's
criminal wrongdoing proliferated, the D.C. Circuit had no interest in overturning
400. Id.
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a coercive sentencing practice that had proved so crucial to breaking the case
wide open.
Ironically, although the D.C. Circuit saw no constitutional issues in Sirica's
sentencing tactics, the Senate Watergate committee's chief counsel later
expressed remorse about his own role in the coercive sentencing of the Watergate
defendants. "I had mixed feelings about Sirica's use of the sentencing power to
induce confessions, even though I had hinted to Sirica that such a strategy would
help the committee and the grand jury[,]" Sam Dash acknowledged. 4031 ,1 Still
thought, as I had argued in the Sweig case, it was an abuse of the sentencing
function." 404
During the Watergate era, the federal circuits split on the question of
whether, and to what degree, trial courts may use coercive sentencing to force
cooperation with investigators. The Third Circuit observed in United States v.
Garcia that sentencing courts should not force defendants to face "a Hobson's
choice: remain silent and lose the opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or
speak and run the risk of additional prosecution."405 The Fifth Circuit reached the
same conclusion in United States v. Rogers.4 06 Conversely, the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits affirmed trial courts that used their sentencing power to
encourage defendants to cooperate with the government, although none involved
outrageously long sentences such as those imposed by Sirica in the Watergate
407
case.
The United States Supreme Court has never resolved the conflict among the
circuits. Nevertheless, in Estelle v. Smith, the Supreme Court held:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is "as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard," and the privilege is fulfilled only when a
criminal defendant is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty . . . for such silence." 408
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405. 544 F.2d 681, 685 (3d Cir. 1976).
406. 504 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1974).
407. United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Chaidez-Castro, 430
F.2d 766, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1970); Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969).
408. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467-68 (1981) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, (1964)).
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V. CONCLUSION
A. The Burglars' Fate
Prior to final sentencing in September 1973, the four Cubans-Sturgis,
Barker, Martinez, and Gonzalez-attempted to withdraw their guilty pleas.4 09
Their motion relied on a novel argument: they contended that when they broke
4111into the Watergate, they believed that they had lawful authority to do so.
According to the burglars, they entered their guilty pleas on the mistaken belief
that the national security of the United States required them to accept convictions
rather than vigorously defend the case, which would risk exposing sensitive
*411intelligence operations.
Sirica denied the Cubans' motion on November 7, 1973, and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed.4' The appellate court noted that the burglars offered no evidence that
any government official told them that they had a "patriotic duty" to remain
silent and plead guilty.413 The court further observed that "the proper question in
this case is not whether appellants entertained the erroneous belief that silence
was their duty, but whether this belief was, in an objective sense, reasonable in
the circumstances." 4 4 The court ruled that it was not. "The guilty pleas were
entered after the prosecution . .. had outlined a virtually airtight case that Hunt
and Liddy had engineered the Watergate Break-in for purely partisan reasons[,J"
the court concluded. 415 "After hearing all this, it was patently unreasonable for
appellants to continue believing that they had been part of a legitimate 'national
security' enterprise requiring their silence at trial."4 16
Hunt also attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, but as co-leader of the
break-in, he had an even weaker claim than the burglars.4 7 Indeed, if anyone
understood the political nature of the break-in, it was Hunt. The D.C. Circuit
unanimously affirmed Sirica's dismissal of Hunt's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.4 18 But the D.C. Circuit did take the opportunity to finally curb some of
Sirica's excesses. The Court of Appeals vacated the three counts that the judge
had demanded Hunt plead guilty to before Sirica would accept his plea deal with
419the prosecution.
409. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 218, 227.
413. Id. at 223.
414. Id. at 224.
415. Id. at 225.
416. Id.
417. United States v. Hunt, 514 F.2d 270, 270 (D.C. Cit. 1975).
418. Id. at 272.
419. Id. at 271 n.2.
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Several years after the Watergate trial, Hunt and McCord sued their lawyers
for malpractice.42( Hunt sued his attorney, William Bittman and the law firm of
Hogan & Hartson, claiming that they had inadequately represented him during
the Watergate trial.421 Hunt also accused Bittman of conspiring with the Nixon
Administration to persuade him to plead guilty, and of having a conflict of
interest for continuing to represent Hunt even after Bittman became a target of
investigation for his covert transfer of White House hush money to Hunt.422 The
trial court granted summary judgment to Bittman and the firm on the grounds
that the three-year statute of limitation had expired on Hunt's claims .42
McCord's malpractice suit was similarly unsuccessful. He sued his attorneys,
F. Lee Bailey and Gerald Alch, "for malpractice, conspiracy to represent [him]
incompetently, and conspiracy to deprive [him of his] civil rights."4 4 The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of
collateral estoppel and failure to state a legally cognizable claim.42 In a separate
proceeding shortly after his conviction in 1973, McCord had unsuccessfully
petitioned the trial court for relief through a writ of error coram nobis, during
426
which he first asserted that he had been a victim of ineffective counsel. In
United States v. McCord, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that McCord's claim of ineffective counsel lacked merit.4 27 In affirming the trial
court in McCord v. Bailey (McCord's malpractice case), the D.C. Circuit
observed, "McCord seeks to relitigate issues concerning the quality of his
criminal trial counsel that he raised in the course of the criminal proceedings.
Having twice raised these issues and lost, McCord cannot raise the claims anew
in a civil case."4
The D.C. Circuit also affirmed the trial court's holding that McCord's
"official authorization" argument was inadequate to sustain a malpractice suit
against his attorneys.49 McCord claimed that his attorneys should have raised the
420. See generally Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. 1017 (D.D.C. 1980); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
421. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. at 1018, 1020.
422. Id. at 1020.
423. Id. at 1026. Hunt filed suit on September 30, 1977, four and a half years after his sentencing at the
Watergate trial. Hunt claimed that the statute of limitations began to run either on the date that the Court of
Appeals affirmed Sirica's denial of Hunt's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or on the day of his incarceration
for his Watergate convictions, which began on April 25, 1975. The court disagreed, however, holding that
Hunt's injury began to accrue on March 23, 1973, the date on which Hunt was first incarcerated following his
provisional sentencing. Id.
424. Bailey, 636 F.2d at 608.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. 509 F.2d 334, 343-45, 351-53 (D.C.Cir.1974).
428. Bailey, 636 F.2d at 611. However, the D.C. Circuit did find that McCord had a colorable civil
rights claim that the defendants conspired to violate his civil rights, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at
618. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit found little merit in the claim, holding merely that it did not appear
"frivolous," and thus should be resolved by the trial court. Id.
429. Id. at 611.
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defense that his involvement in the Watergate break-in stemmed from his good
faith belief that the break-in was legal because the Attorney General had
authorized it.4) The D.C. Circuit rejected McCord's argument. The appeals court
held that it was "unimaginable" that McCord could make the necessary showing
that "he had some objective basis to believe the Watergate operation enjoyed
official sanction." 4 31 As the court emphasized, McCord worked for the CRP, not a
government agency; his superior, G. Gordon Liddy, was likewise a CRP
employee, and McCord himself had never had direct contact with any
government officials.4 The D.C. Circuit also noted, "McCord conceded before
the Senate Watergate Committee that his bugging and surveillance all concerned
political activities and that McCord himself harbored suspicions that the
operations were unrelated to national security or other legitimate government
interest." 433 The court concluded, therefore, that "to the extent there is an official
authorization defense, it could not apply to McCord." 434
B. The Trial's Legacy
The outcome of the burglars' trial transformed Sirica from an
undistinguished district court judge to a national icon. Time named Sirica its
"Man of the Year" for 1973.435 Time declared that by "stubbornly and doggedly
pursuing the truth in his courtroom regardless of its political implications, [Sirica
had] forced Watergate into the light of investigative day.",4 6 It noted that although
Sirica claimed "no pretensions to legal erudition," the judge's commitment to
finding out the truth behind Watergate broke the case wide open.4 Judge Sirica,
the editors concluded:
[S]imply did not believe that the seven lowly burglars who had
wiretapped Democratic National Committee headquarters at
Washington's Watergate complex in June 1972 were a self-starting team
working alone. Injudicially, some have argued, but undeniably in the
higher national interest, as others would insist, he applied pressure until
he got a scandal-bursting response.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 612.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Man of the Year, Judge John J. Sirica: Standing Firm for the Primacy of Law, TiME, Jan. 7, 1974,
at 1.
436. Id. at 8.
437. Id.
438. Id.
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Not everyone was impressed by Sirica's performance. With much less
fanfare, Chesterfield Smith, the president of the ABA, sharply criticized Sirica's
coercive use of provisional sentencing. "We must be concerned about a federal
judge-no matter how worthy his motives or how much we may applaud his
results-using the criminal-sentencing process as a means and tool for further
criminal investigation of others[.]" 439 Smith's successor, James Feller, took an
even stronger position, likening Sirica's sentencing tactics to "the torture rack
and the Spanish Inquisition."'44" Philip Kurland, a prominent University of
Chicago constitutional law expert, called the sentences "'a form of extortion.""
Sirica himself shrugged off the criticism. "I had no intention of sitting on the
bench like a nincompoop and watching the parade go by[,]" he explained in his
autobiography. 4 4 2 "If the action I took constitutes the action of a so-called 'activist
judge,' I plead guilty to the charge." 4 4 3
The Watergate prosecutors faced sharp scrutiny of their own. Charles
Morgan, the director of the ACLU, accused Silbert and his fellow prosecutors of
intentionally failing to pursue leads to the White House. The ACLU director
claimed that the prosecutors had simply parroted "the Nixon Administration's
story to the Court and to the public."445 When the Nixon Administration
nominated Earl Silbert to be United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
in 1974, a handful of Senate Democrats opposed the nomination. Senator James
Abourezek of South Dakota asserted that it remained an open question "whether
Mr. Silbert participated in a cover-up" by "deliberately limiting the Watergate
investigation.""' Senator John Tunney of California charged, "I think it is all too
clear that the prosecutors were intimidated" by the Nixon White House.'
During his nomination hearings, Silbert defended his approach to the case on
the grounds that, prior to McCord's letter to Judge Sirica, the prosecutors had no
evidence of a wider conspiracy. Silbert explained that the only way to defeat a
conspiracy to obstruct justice "is to get an insider" to testify against the
conspirators." But Silbert acknowledged that during the investigation and trial,
the prosecutors "could not get any insider" to cooperate. 449 "That was our
problem, and that is why we adopted the strategy we did, to indict and convict,"
439. Id. at 19.
440. Id. For a contemporaneous critique of Sirica's approach to the trial by a former federal prosecutor,
see George V. Higgins, The Judge Who Tried Harder, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1974, at 83-106.
441. Man of the Year, supra note 452, at 19.
442. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 127.
443. Id.
444. Silbert Hearings, supra note 124, at 5-6.
445. Id. at 18.
446. 94 CONG. REc. 32,273-74 (Oct. 8, 1975).
447. Id. at 32,288.
448. Silbert Hearings, supra note 124, at 181.
449. Id.
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Silbert recalled, "and then immunize so that we could get inside to see what, if
anything, there was to find out."450
However, the thorough and probing nature of Sirica's plea colloquy
undermined the prosecution's strategy. Had McCord followed the same tactic as
Hunt-that is, plead guilty and deny White House involvement in the hope of
receiving a presidential pardon-the prosecutors would have lost their best
chance to tie the White House to Watergate. Sirica's plea colloquy established a
record that rendered almost useless any future testimony that was inconsistent
with the witnesses' previous sworn denials of White House involvement. Thus,
in the end, Sirica's outrageous tactics were far more effective at getting to the
bottom of Watergate than the prosecution's cautious strategy was.
Nevertheless, in defense of Silbert, the federal district court judges for the
District of Columbia-including John Sirica-unanimously endorsed Silbert's
nomination. 451 Daniel Rezneck, the president of the D.C. Bar, declared, "Those of
us in the Washington legal community who know Mr. Silbert and his work
consider him to be an outstanding attorney, a vigorous prosecutor and a person of
integrity."45 The great majority of senators in both parties agreed. The Senate
voted to confirm Silbert's nomination by the overwhelming margin of eighty-
four to twelve.
Likewise, Judge Sirica's detractors also remained in the minority. The
undeniable fact was that Sirica's methods had achieved a result that most
Americans applauded. "From March 1973 onward," Stanley Kutler observed,
"Judge Sirica was lionized in the media by liberals and conservatives alike." 454
Even Professor Kurland later softened his tone, concluding that Sirica "played an
important and honorable, if not always correct, part . . . ." in the Watergate
affair.45
Yet, as Harvey Katz of Washingtonian Magazine noted, the fact that Sirica
became "the darling of many civil libertarians for his conduct in United States v.
Liddy" was "one of the most astonishing of the many astonishing developments
of Watergate." 456 Indeed, rather than condemn Sirica, the director of the ACLU
publicly chastised Silbert and his fellow prosecutors for not mounting a more
aggressive investigation. 45 7 According to Gordon Liddy, Charles Morgan
privately acknowledged that his organization would have challenged Sirica's
tactics if Liddy had been a more sympathetic defendant.48
450. Id.
451. Id. at 111.
452. Id. at 115.
453. 94 CONG. REC. 32,289 (Oct. 8, 1975).
454. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE, supra note 5, at 260.
455. Philip Kurland, The Power and the Glory: Passing Thoughts on Reading Judge Sirica's Watergate
Expose, 32 STAN. L. REV. 217, 228 (1979).
456. Harvey Katz, Some Call It Justice II, 8 WASHINGTONIAN 72, 127 (Sept. 1973).
457. Silbert Hearings, supra note 124, at 18.
458. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 285.
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Regardless of whether Liddy's account is accurate, the fact that most
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars endorsed-or at least did not condemn-
Sirica's tactics spoke volumes about the political atmosphere of 1973 and 1974.
Joseph Lord III, chief judge of the United States District Court in Philadelphia,
proclaimed Sirica's conduct of the Watergate case as "nothing short of
masterful."459 William Byrne, the senior judge on the United States District Court
in Los Angeles, called Sirica "a credit to the judiciary."46 () Judge Carl Rubin of
the United States District Court in Dayton, Ohio, claimed that the "stature of
every district judge in this country has been enormously increased by the
example[of Sirica's] courage and dedication to principles we all hold dear."
Judge Rubin added that "only the federal courts stand between the citizens and a
state of near anarchy."46
As the alarmist tone of Judge Rubin's comments suggested, for most
Americans the growing evidence that the United States had a criminal in the Oval
Office outweighed procedural concerns about the legal and constitutional rights
of the Watergate burglars. Although that view is understandable in light of the
national crisis posed by Watergate, it should also be deeply troubling.
Watergate's outcome has long been celebrated as evidence that the American
political system could rid itself of a scoundrel in the White House. But the means
by which the system reached that outcome showed that, under the extraordinary
circumstances of Watergate, our nation's courts were willing to sacrifice the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants in order to achieve a political
objective. That is not a legacy any American lawyer, judge, or legal scholar
should be proud of.
For his part, Judge Sirica never doubted the ultimate legacy of the Watergate
trial. As he wrote in his autobiography:
What has always seemed to me important about the break-in trial is that
those in other parts of the government who were trying to push the facts
aside-to stop the search for truth at a point where only the seven
original defendants had been brought to justice-encountered an active
and objective judiciary that was beyond their control.4 62
459. Man of the Year, Judge John J. Sirica: Standing Firm for the Primacy of Law, TIME, Jan. 7, 1974,
at 15.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. SIRICA, supra note 11, at 122.
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G. Gordon Liddy was more blunt. "Just as I do," Liddy wrote, "John Sirica
believes the end justifies the means, and in the Watergate trial he put that
philosophy into practice."
463. LIDDY, supra note 21, at 282. In February 1999, the ABA House of Delegates adopted "black
letter" standards for trial judges in criminal cases. In Standard 6-1.1 ("General Responsibility of the Trial
Judge"), the ABA declared, "The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should not allow the proceedings to
be used for any other purpose." CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS § 6-1.1(a) (1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/trialjudge.htin1 (last visited January 1, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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